International Relations:  
Theory on Four Levels of Analysis

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INTRODUCTION

Without a detailed understanding of the extensive theories on four levels of international relations, it is difficult to comprehend exactly how technology and security can be utilized in the expanding world around us. Security has always been an extremely significant aspect of humanities development; and as a species, humankind has come to realize the importance of technology, as it relates to security. The current article will describe all four levels in great detail, and provide an in-depth discussion upon the various theories at each level of analysis. Drawing upon the scholarly work of the most predominant research to date, the following will correlate each level with a broad spectrum of a theoretical analysis.

SYSTEMIC-LEVEL

There are four imperative levels of analysis in international relations theory; systemic-level, all-level, state-level, and sub-state-level.1 Moreover, it is the intention of the succeeding research to encompass the major assumptions at each level of analysis, and major proponents of each theory, beginning with the systemic-level theory. The systemic-level theory utilizes the

international systems as a means to analyze international relations. This specific level includes classical realism, neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism.

As a response to human nature, classical realism was first introduced in the work of political thinkers such as Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Classical realism has four main assumptions to system-level international relations theory. First, classical realists argue that the states are the main actors in the system. Secondly, they purpose that all of the states are rational, unitary actors. Thirdly, classical realists contest that all of the rational, unitary main actors or states, pursue their own interests. The interest of the state is power; and this ultimate determining factor of the state is equivalent to security. Furthermore, in classical realism power is fungible; meaning military power and economic power are mutually interchangeable. To classical realists, the state of human nature is anarchic, and there is no international order; therefore, there is no central structure or authority which exists to resolve interstate disputes. Lastly, since all states pursue their own interests (i.e. power) without centralized authority, there will inevitably be conflicts of interests among the states.

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Neorealism provides a different perspective to systemic-level theory. Although neorealist agree that states are rational, unitary actors in the international system; they deviate from classical realists in regards to states’ interests. Neorealism contends that the anarchic international system’s nature forces states to focus on their own individual internal and external power. Being that states function similarly, all states desire to maximize their security, as opposed to classical realists’ assumption of power. To neorealists, power is a means to security, not the end goal itself. In other words, states only seek power in order to defend themselves from other states; thus, power is simply an extension of security.

The “Security Dilemma” analogy is central to providing the explanation to neorealist theory. A balancing act of security among states compels states to compete with one another, both externally and internally. For instance, in the security dilemma, as a state’s security increases, that another state’s security will surely decrease and this imbalance creates tacit pressure on states to neither lead nor lag in the international system. It also leads to much more miscalculations, arms races, and wars.

Also, there are various ways that a state can counter a threat of another state, or balances the level of security. The internal balancing that states can attempt to create involves their militaristic abilities, as well as their economic strength. These two internal aspects of a state are essential to a state’s individual international potential. Externally, neorealists’ advocate alliances with other states support a states’ security. This external balancing will also lead to the

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formation of an international structure. According to neorealists, balancing is defensive in nature, and it creates a more stable system. Also, bandwagoning can also occur, which involves weak states joining with powerful states to prevent being attacked by a greater power. It is also suggested that the weaker states may benefit from the success of the greater state that it aligns itself with in order to find security in the international system.9

This specific systemic-level theory also describes three basic shifts in the balance of power: polarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity.10 Polarity, affecting the likelihood of war or peace, consists of only the primary powerful states, alliances, or political structures.11 Polarity can describe how power shifted up until the Cold War throughout the world. With the exception of well-known empires, the majority of human history consisted of polarity from this perspective. Bipolarity, wherein only two states wield international power, is expressed by neorealists as the most stable of the three because there is a decreased risk of miscalculations. Bipolarity can be best described by the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States of America were the only states that were significant enough at that time in history, and throughout the course of nearly forty five years, there were no direct military battles between the antagonists (although billions of dollars and millions of lives were lost in ‘proxy wars’). As stated by Kenneth Waltz, “neorealism contends that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit-level explanation of traditional realism. By emphasizing how structures

affect actions and outcomes, neorealism rejects the assumption that man’s innate lust for power constitutes a sufficient cause of war in the absence of any other.”

Neoliberal institutionalism is another theory at the systemic-level. In analyzing international relations at this level, neoliberal institutionalism focuses on international institutions and regimes which they perceive enable international cooperation. This theory agrees with classical realists on two assumptions of international relations including the belief that states are the main actors, and that all states are rational, and unitary (as neorealism also concludes).

In addition, neoliberal institutionalism accedes with neorealism’s assumption that international cooperation is indeed plausible, even in an anarchic international system. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism disagree about the chances for international cooperation. The basic disagreement between the

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two schools concerns the nature of the interaction between states. Neorealists argue that states are predisposed toward conflict and competition and often fail to cooperate even when they have common interests because self-help systems make the cooperation of parties difficult. Neoliberals contend that these pessimistic assumptions are unfounded because neorealists underestimate the influence of international institutions.\textsuperscript{15} Extending from the realist perspective upon a state’s individual desire for power, which then neorealism contributed to by concluding that power is measured by its security, neoliberal institutionalism provides a compelling argument in regards to international cooperation in the anarchic international system.\textsuperscript{16}

Additionally, international cooperation presupposes three important aspects; anarchy mustn’t always be based on competition and self-reliance; the gains of a state are not relative, but measured in absolute terms; and the neorealist assumption based on the security dilemma is not necessarily inevitable.\textsuperscript{17} The cooperation that neoliberal institutionalism suggests at the international level is thus arguably ensured by monitoring and enforcing agreements, the reduction of uncertainty in regards to the capabilities and intentions of other states, the creation of conditions for reciprocity (by linking


issues), and extending out the “shadow of the future” (time horizons) among cooperating states. Neoliberal institutionalism, suggests that institutions, such as the IAEA and IMF can help states overcome impediments to cooperation, as states have an incentive to cooperate (public goods) or learn how to work together (reciprocity). The “Stag Hunt” analogy which argues that self-interest leads to defection, which causes strife and added cost; also suggests that cooperation benefits everyone. This analogy provides an essential argument to neoliberal institutionalism.

Another analogy, central to the concept of cooperation, is the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” analogy. A predominant example of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” analogy at the systemic-level of international relations is applied to an international treaty interpretation. Two prisoners are brought into a precinct. Separately, the individuals are approached by an attorney to negotiate a ‘deal’ for prison length. These prisoners are presented with options: defect or cooperate. In defecting, prisoner A rats out prisoner B. In cooperating, prisoner A does not rat out prisoner B.

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assumption (or hope) that prisoner B will also cooperate. Prisoner B is given mirrored options. The payoffs depend on the option the prisoners choose. If prisoner A betrays B while B cooperates, prisoner A comes out on top; if both prisoners cooperate, they both win— a mutual benefit; when both rat out each other, both lose; and, when prisoner A cooperates, but B betrays, prisoner A loses.22 This illustration of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” analogy provides the need for cooperation in the specific scenario, and can also be applied to various other examples of international relations.

A fourth approach to analyzing the systemic-level of international relation is constructivism. This theory differs vastly from the three that were previously discussed in this article. Constructivism focuses on the historic and social constructs of international relations, as opposed to human nature. The three key assumptions of constructivism include: states are the main units of analysis; international politics come from social constructs: “objective” relationships do not exist; and national identities drive national interests.23 National identities include norms, beliefs, and the social identities of individuals. Strictly speaking, as a social theory, constructivism challenges materialism by hypothesizing the structures of human association as “primarily cultural rather than material phenomena,” and rationalism by arguing for their function as not only behavior-regulating but also identity- and interest-constructing, though “material forces,” it admits, “still matter,” and “people,” it acknowledges, “are still

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intentional actors. Constructivism argues that statesmen and other people are motivated by their sense of identity, and what is considered appropriate by their particular culture; not only material interests. As opposed to that of other theories, constructivism points to how the ultimate subjectivity of interests and their links to changing identities.

At the systemic-level of analysis in international relations, the theories explained above demonstrate an extremely chaotic, unyielding, and provocative structure. This is mainly due to the infancy of international institutions. History exhibits humanities passion for exploration, conquest, and exploitation. It was not until recently that man completed its goal to explore the entirety of the world. This change in circumstances has led to a new political environment. One that contrasts the world that humanity lived upon for thousands of years; in which, the need for global stability relies on international cooperation among states that wish to build a global community, and direct humanity into a prosperous future.

Game-theory thinking relies on the fact that actors usually try to anticipate how others will behave, assuming they would act likewise; although they may not do so accurately, as Israel did not in 1973. In November 2012, Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system performed

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admirably in protecting against rockets fired from Gaza, but by doing so may have allowed the Palestinians to attack with relative safety. That is, without these defenses, Israel almost surely would have responded to the attacks with a ground invasion, something Hamas very much wanted to avoid, and so it might not have launched anything like the barrage that it did had Israel remained undefended.

By examining the various theories regarding the systemic-level of analysis, the history of international relations illustrates the enduring distance that humanity has traveled up until this point; and although realism does provide the most salient explanation of our past, humanity can only hope for international cooperation among states. So, which theory is right, and which was is wrong? There is no simple explanation to international relations. Because it involves changeable human behaviors, international politics will never be like physics: It has no strong determinist theory.

**ALL-LEVELS**

The second level of analysis, including three strategies that will be discussed within the current article is all-levels. All-level theories includes three types of interaction on the international level; coercion, deterrence, and compellence. This level of analysis encompasses and integrates all of the levels of international theory that have been mentioned within the

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discussion. Still, in this theory they are only applicable in specific, limited circumstances; confrontation and conflict.\textsuperscript{30}

Firstly, coercion is defined by convincing an opponent to do something that they would not typically do, includes the use of force whether it is a threat or actually carried out by an actor. There must also be will; not simply the capabilities to carry the actions out alone. Deterrence is preventing an opponent from taking actions against the interests of the other state. All-levels theory argues that deterrence is achieved by making the costs of refusal outweigh the benefits, as well as using threat against armed aggressors, escalating the chance of attack. The third all-levels theory is compellence, which consists of undoing actions that have already taken place.\textsuperscript{31} This also involves convincing an opponent, but unlike coercion, prospect theory (as discussed under sub-state-level theory) is incorporated in compellence. Opponents perceive an action that has already happened much differently then they perceive an action that they have not yet fulfilled. Compellence is also


much more difficult to achieve than deterrence because it is much harder to let go of something
than to obtain it.\footnote{Kleinberg, Howard. "CMR-545 Technology and Security Spring 2015 Module 1 PowerPoint." Class Lecture, Slide 71, Wilmington, February 20, 2015.}

Furthermore, there are four requirements to be successful in deterring or compelling an
opponent. These four requirements include: capability, credibility, communication, and
calculation.\footnote{Kleinberg, Howard. "CMR-545 Technology and Security Spring 2015 Module 1 PowerPoint." Class Lecture, Slide 72, Wilmington, February 20, 2015.} First, there must be a capability to inflict costs on an opponent. This is usually
perceived through the usage of a military, but it can also be an economic loss (as mentioned in
the beginning of this article in regards to the fungible nature of a state’s militaristic and
economic power). Secondly, there must already be credibility behind the state and its
capabilities. An opponent has to take any communication seriously in order to be successful in
deterrence or compellence. Regarding communication, a state must also be very clear in its
communications to its opponent. All that the state wants to gain, and what it is willing to do if it
is not achieved must be communicated thoroughly to the opponent. Lastly, the opponent must be
making rational cost-benefit calculations for coercion to be successful.\footnote{Kleinberg, Howard. "CMR-545 Technology and Security Spring 2015 Module 1 PowerPoint." Class Lecture, Slide 72, Wilmington, February 20, 2015.}

**STATE-LEVEL**

At the state-level of analysis, there are three predominant theories. These include
democratic peace, strategic culture, and revisionism.\footnote{Kleinberg, Howard. "CMR-545 Technology and Security Spring 2015 Module 1 PowerPoint." Class Lecture, Slide 72, Wilmington, February 20, 2015.} A democracy is considered the best form
of government for a country to create for peace and stability. There are two main mechanisms of
democratic peace, which include: institutional constraints, and peaceful norms and values.\textsuperscript{36} The various institutional constraints include the use of elections, a strict rule of law, civilian control over the military, checks and balances in the governmental structure itself, and public opinion; which is essential. The norms and values for democratic peace include a positive view of other democracies, and peaceful dispute resolution with other (usually democratic) states; which in turn, eliminates the “Security Dilemma”\textsuperscript{37} discussed in the systemic-level analysis of this research.

Even during the Cold War, when realism clearly predominated, the idea that regime type has an important impact on foreign policies and international politics received some attention. One ultimately important research effort by Babst (1972), however, was virtually invisible to most specialists in international politics at the time. Utilizing data from Wright (1942), as well as a reasonably clear, operational definition of democracy, Babst (1972 p. 55) concluded that "no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments between 1789 and 1941."\textsuperscript{38} The proposition that democracies are overall more peaceful, dates as far back to the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant.

In addition, democratic states have free-market economies, and, since they are better able to offer credible commitments regarding the terms of trade and capital flows than authoritarian states, they are more inclined to trade with one another. Interdependence promotes peace by increasing contacts among democracies and contributing to mutual understanding. Trade helps


create transnational ties that encourage accommodation rather than conflict. Furthermore, trade is mutually beneficial to its participants, and war may negatively affect a country’s economy because it could potentially cut off critical imports or exports. Finally, trade tends to decrease the benefits of conquest. Thus, the potential loss of trade decreases the willingness of both sides to fight. Thus, among democracies the ability to sustain peaceful relationships has proven successful.

On the contrary, peace for the democracy does not mean peace between the democratic state and a non-democratic state. There has been a sufficient amount of research in regards to the impact that democratic states have upon non-democratic states. One of the responses to this criticism has involved moving away from the dyad-year as the unit of observation for statistical calculation, and instead making a single observation for each pair of states over a given period, say from 1946 to 1986. Pairs are categorized by their regime types, i.e. both democratic, only one democratic, or neither democratic. Then the probability can be calculated that all pairs at war with each other during that period would be either mixed dyads (one democratic, one autocratic) or uniformly autocratic. Both Russett (1995), Rummel (1997) performed analyses along these lines and concluded that the absence of any democratic pairs among those states becoming involved in wars against each other from 1946 to 1986 is unlikely to have occurred by chance.

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Maoz (1997) has completed analogous analyses for the years 1816 to 1986 and came to the same conclusion.41

It has also been suggested that the term democratic peace refers only to states that are democratic. Other scholars have also argued that the definition of democracy has been manipulated at times, which causes more issues. Democracies may be more prone to wage wars v. non-democracies, and democracies tend to wage more intense and destructive wars than non-democracies. Democratizing states may be the most war-prone of all (e.g.s: post-WWI Germany, post-Cold-War Serbia).42 Probably the most visible attack on the credibility of the democratic peace proposition was that by Mansfield & Snyder (1995a, b), ably defended from initial criticism in Mansfield & Snyder (1996). Interestingly, however, theirs was not a direct attack on the proposition. They did not claim that joint democracy has no significant pacifying affect on relationships between states. Rather, they argued that democratization, that is, regime transitions from autocracy to democracy, make states significantly more war-prone.43

Strategic culture theory at the state-level analysis encompasses different cultures within states that make different strategic choices.44 Alistair Iain Johnston claims "different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites. Ahistorical or 'objective' variables such as

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technology, polarity, or relative material capabilities are all of secondary importance (Johnston 2005: 34). Strategic culture includes the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses, the efficacy of the use of force, and the role of war in regards to the environment of the culture in the state. There are also assumptions at a more operational level which include the strategic options that are the more efficacious for dealing with the threat environment; defined by the three questions prior to the assumptions.

Other approaches such as Ken Booth’s Strategy and Ethnocentrism (1979) and Colin Gray’s ‘National Style in Strategy’ (1981) also highlighted the situational nature of strategy. Booth writes that strategic culture "has influence on the form in which one state interacts with the others concerning security measures (Booth 1991: 121)." As stated by Booth, "it includes national traditions, habits, values, attitudes, ways of behaviour, symbols, approaches and special processes chosen to influence external environment and the ways of solution of problems face to face to threats or to using of force (Booth 1991: 121)." And Gray accentuates mainly behaviour of political elites, that is why he defines strategic culture as a sum of thoughts, attitudes, traditions and behaviours which make strategic culture a part of us, of our institutions and of our

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acts (Gray, 1999).\textsuperscript{48} Culture has increasingly become more important in international relations. Although, as strategic culture suggests, it has always been an aspect that shapes political thought, it was not until the post-Cold War era that it became a significant part of scholarly interest.

Strategic culture can be defined by stating that history, capabilities, geopolitics and values affect the strategy of states and their individual behavior.

The third theory at the state-level of analysis is revisionism. This particular viewpoint stems from those states that perceive international relations as a creation of western ideas; predominantly democratized states. One type of revisionism includes the desire to change the status quo because they feel that they are at a disadvantage, internationally.\textsuperscript{50} The intention of this type of revisionism is not to completely change the prevailing international order, but to change some aspects of it. Also, in regards to his type, revisionist does not reflect the true nature


of the actors to which the term is usually applied. Conceptually a revisionist state or organization may be a status quo actor wishing to introduce some changes in an otherwise acceptable order.\textsuperscript{51} In other words, Napoleonic France, modern Iran, and Castro’s Cuba would not be considered status quo revisionist powers because the purpose behind their intentions may be revolutionary, but also aspires to change the international balance of power. These revisionists are more prone to implement policies that revise the prevailing order in the region that they have sovereign power. In other words, they are inclined to reshape their own state’s political identity internationally.\textsuperscript{52}

The second type of revisionism includes the states that are unhappy with the existing international system, such as North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and Iran. These revisionist states do seek to change the international balance of power. This can be best illustrated by the balance of power since the Cold War. For instance, China, Iran, and Russia never bought into the geopolitical settlement that followed the Cold War, and they are making increasingly forceful attempts to overturn it. That process will not be peaceful, and whether or not the revisionists succeed, their efforts have already shaken the balance of power and changed the dynamics of international politics.\textsuperscript{53} These states disagree with the shape of the international system, and they will use force to attempt to shift power in their favor.


These theories explain international relations at the state-level of analysis. As in comparison to the systemic-level of analysis, there is not a predominant explanation for this level of analysis; but by utilizing the various theories at the state-level of analysis, a great deal can be explained as to what the underlying causes are in a state’s decision-making process overall. Conclusively, without a greater explanatory power at the state-level of analysis of international relations; the accuracy of a theory is often determined by a specific case study. Although, at the state-level of analysis there is consistency across the board in regards to cultural and political identity, this is because of the nature of the state itself. State-level theories are therefore highly dependent on the social norms and identities of the population that resides within the state.

**SUB-STATE-LEVEL**

The sub-state-level of analysis concerns the inner workings of the governmental structure of each individual state. At the sub-state-level of analysis, there are many theories that exist. Moreover, there are three primary theories at the sub-state-level of analysis which best explain international relations. The following will discuss bureaucratic politics, organizational politics, and individual politics.\(^{54}\)

Firstly, bureaucratic politics focuses on the bureaucratic control over the state’s decision-making process. There are also bargaining processes going within, and between the different bureaucracies of the state. The concept of the state is not part of bureaucratic politics because

policymaking is driven by the nature of each bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{55} Also, bureaucracies pursue their own interests, are hierarchical, and inherent characteristics of democratic politics. They must also follow the perspectives and agendas of the people within the state; which includes exactly who they are, where they are, and exactly how important they are in relation to the various bureaucracies’ decision-making process.\textsuperscript{56}

Additionally, there are four issues concerning the policymaking in bureaucracies. These four problems of bureaucratic policymaking include the principal-agent problems, or flow of information; procedural problems, or agenda-setting and decision rules; psychological problems, or ways of thinking and formulating problems and solutions; and “group-think”, or members all ‘think alike’, or fear to dissent (e.g. the DOD v. State Department in the United States of America).\textsuperscript{57} This sub-state-level theory contests that the leaders of a state are a diverse group of competitive players which are hierarchical in structure, and that they use bargaining strategies to make decisions that create the policies of the government.

The second theory opposes bureaucratic politics, by stating that bureaucracies are not the only governmental formation that makes decisions, and advocate policies. Organizational politics focuses on the limitations of organizational information processing. This theory argues that all organizations struggle with the decision-making process. Also, organizational politics theory dismisses the idea that decision makers can logically identify all objectives and means as they choose their selections in the decision-making process without an impact of outside forces.

such as emotions, personal biases, misperceptions, miscommunications, uncertainty, or external opinion; or ‘rationality’ (i.e. means-ends calculations’). Instead, organizational politics focuses on how each individual organization goes about formulating and following its own decision-making process.

Therefore, organizational politics suggests five methods for organizations to manage the problems that arise concerning information. These five methods include narrowing the range of available options; locating satisfactory and sufficient solutions; adopting a standard operating procedure; developing missions and cultures; and resisting changing the methodology itself. Thereby choosing organization-selected solutions that are best suited and consistently fix the organizational problems, as well as creating an organizational culture that shapes the behavior of the individuals within the organization. The method to manage information problems also ensures that there is trust in perceived effectiveness of the methodology, but it is argued that such resistance to change the methodology creates an unwillingness to invest in new ideas, and can hinder information-flow and solutions.

The third sub-state-level of analysis is individual politics wherein theorists attempt to understand how individuals process information to make decisions. This theory seeks generalizable psychological explanations to explain an individual’s decision-making process. Also, cognitive and emotional biases are a key component of individual politics. Individual’s

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mental processes of perception, memory, judgment, and reasoning highly affect the decisions that they make, and these various cognitive attributes also can create bias. ‘A theory that incorporates framing effects has been proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).\(^6^2\) Termed prospect theory, it has been extraordinarily influential. It is based on the idea that people evaluate gains or losses in prospect theory from some neutral or status quo point, an assumption consistent with the adaptation-level findings that occur not just in perception but in virtually all experience. That is, we adapt to a constant level of virtually any psychological dimension and find it to be neutral. In a similar way, we adapt to the reduced light in a movie theater when we enter it—finding it not particularly dark after a few seconds—and then readapt to the much brighter light outside when we leave the theater—finding it not to be unusually bright after a few seconds. But since choice varies by framing it as a gain or a loss, it cannot reveal underlying preferences.’ Dawes (2001, p. 195).\(^6^3\)


In addition, framing effects, such as how the word usage can affect an individual’s understanding of information is another example of cognitive bias. Three other cognitive biases that are the most notable include: coordination and intent; attribution errors; and clear motives.\textsuperscript{64} All of these biases are beliefs that individuals have based on their own mental capacity.

Individual politics argues that the truth is that the human brain cannot process all of the information in the decision-making process. Therefore, it takes shortcuts, ignores trade-offs, makes inappropriate analogies and premature closure in the process itself. These are not psychological disorders, but explanations to how humans process information, in general.\textsuperscript{65}

Emotional biases such as wishful thinking, bolstering, selective memory, and scenario fulfillment are all ways that individual’s emotions can cause bias in individual politics theory as well. These emotional biases are due to the fact that once an individual makes a decision, they typically form a positive outlook, overestimating the reality of their previous actions. Individual politics theory states that, given these two biases individuals tend to overestimate their own reasonableness, and others’ hostile intentions. In sum, these information-processing problems affect everyone.\textsuperscript{66}

Conclusively, to understand the actions of a state—indeed, of any large, complex organization—one must understand the rules governing its decision-making processes and the motivations of actors participating therein. The result of such a process may well indicate a compromise point without any clear internal strategic logic and may even reflect the unintended

consequence of a dynamic tug-of-war among actors. Thus, it may be very difficult to interpret the intentions that underlie the seemingly strategic behaviour of complex organizations, making interactions with these bodies less predictable and, in some spheres, such as international conflict, consequently more dangerous.\textsuperscript{67} As bureaucratic politics illustrates how the hierarchical organization of policymaking is characterized by bargaining based upon self-interests, organizational politics explains other key players in the decision-making process and suggests ways to solve problems that may arise. Individual politics further details how the individuals within the state process information, and make decisions. These various theories embody democratic politics, as well as demonstrate how predominant, powerful organizations are currently managed on the international level.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

The theories mentioned above, on each of the four levels of analysis provide an understanding of the recent scholarly work in international relations. All of these theories have a place in international relations, each depending upon the particular moment in time. Although realism has been an ongoing theory since states have come to power, neoliberalism, constructivism, and neorealism have all earned a place on the systemic-level of analysis. As time has come to pass, the growth of international relations has spawned a great deal of scholarly research that can further understanding of the determinants of actions, from cultures to individual leaders.

It is suffice to say, technology and security play a significant role at each level, within all the theories. A glance at the daily newspaper is enough to convince even the most casual observer that there are international dimensions to almost every aspect of science and technology and that science and technology play a crucial role in foreign policy and international affairs.68 However power is defined, technology is a tool that determines if a state, organizations, or an individual wields the power to play a role in international relations. Without technology, it would be next to impossible for any contender to be able to compete today. From realism on the systemic-level to sub-state level actors, such as bureaucracies and the individual, technology is fundamental to modern day security.

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