REFLECTION, EVALUATION, INTEGRATION

Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium

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Introduction

Scholars engaged in foreign policy analysis (FPA) have forged new paths of inquiry essential to opening the black box of domestic politics and policymaking in an effort to understand actors’ choices in global politics. It is now broadly accepted that different levels of analysis—individual factors, inputs into the decision process, and institutional as well as cultural and societal factors—converge to shape foreign policy outputs. The seminal works of Richard Snyder, James Rosenau, Alexander George, Graham Allison, and Irving Janis among others have suggested the relevance of learning about the stories behind foreign policy decisions and have encouraged recent generations to create a new set of “lenses” that bring some focus to the complex picture that emerges. Through these efforts, foreign policy analysts have made the case for middle-range theorizing that pushes beyond the confines of the assumptions of general international relations theories.

After reflecting on the past and current state of affairs in FPA, the challenge posed in this set of essays is to suggest a set of concepts that will take the field beyond the boundaries of current analysis. This symposium evaluates several streams of thought in FPA, reflecting various levels of analysis and types of problems and in the process fleshes out a new agenda for the field. Although not an attempt to cover all aspects of contemporary FPA research, taken together the essays illustrate the specific kinds of contributions that an analysis of foreign policy can continue to make to the study of international affairs. The collective vision that emerges is one of anticipating the nature of a future research agenda as well as recognizing the various challenges that persist for the field.

The diversity of perspectives that exist in the field of FPA today is well represented in these essays—which draw on multiple theories, employ a range of methodologies, focus on the complex interactions between foreign policy factors, and link scholarly research to practical policy concerns. The first essay evaluates the role of identity in foreign policy and presents a new imperative for the study of comparative foreign policy. Taking a different tack, the second essay demonstrates how foreign policy provides the tools to understand the world and how the future of FPA is linked to what happens in the international and domestic political settings. The third essay argues for the need for tolerance of different methodological approaches to foreign policy analysis. This symposium builds on papers produced for these linked panels.

1. The authors would like to thank Philip Schrodt for his challenge to us to think about the future of foreign policy analysis. For the International Studies Association annual meeting in Chicago in 2001, Schrodt organized two linked panels focusing on institutional and psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis. This symposium builds on papers produced for these linked panels.
approaches within the analysis of foreign policy. It maintains that techniques such as experiments and psychological assessments at-a-distance (with new computerized coding options) can transform the study of foreign policy. Continuing the focus on social psychological approaches, the fourth essay uses a discussion of group dynamics to think about how individual cognitions can be aggregated in a group setting and, thus, shape decision outcomes. The final essay focuses our attention on crisis decision making as it compares and contrasts the positions of multiperspectivists and integrators in the study of foreign policy.

This symposium is not a justification for the study of foreign policy. Criticisms of the field—such as having no grand theory, not being postpositivist enough, being reductionist, and having too much of a US foreign policy orientation—continue to be debated (see Light 1994; Hudson 1995; Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995; White 1999). The most recent round of debates on the value of FPA has emerged as a result of changes in the international system. On the one hand, critics charge that post-Cold War changes (that is, interdependence, the increasing numbers of regional and international organizations, and concern about global problems and permanent membership in alliances) have challenged the nature of the state and its ability to forge foreign policy and have made the field less relevant. As Margot Light (1994:100) notes, “there is a steady erosion of a separate concept of foreign policy.” On the other hand, some argue that these same changes in the international system make the study of foreign policy more significant. As Valerie Hudson (1995:211) suggests:

interest in FPA has . . . grown because the questions being asked in FPA are those for which we most need answers. . . . There is no longer a stable and predictable system in the international arena. Now, more than ever, objectively operationalized indices do not seem to provide sufficient inputs to ensure the success of simplified expected utility equations.

The authors in this symposium assume neither of these extreme positions. Although changes in the international system have indeed altered the nature of the state and foreign policy, states still exist and significant continuities in the factors that shape their foreign policies and foreign policymaking remain. Indeed, it is dangerous to use changes in the post-Cold War era to justify the field of FPA because such arguments can come precariously close to undermining past research by implying that domestic politics and decision-making processes are important now, but were not important during the Cold War. In the end, the best justification for the study of foreign policy comes from the quality of the scholarship being done in this field. What follows is an overview of some of that scholarship and a discussion of possible directions in which the field could develop.

**Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century:**

**Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas**

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Current research in foreign policy analysis (FPA) is vibrant and multidimensional; it bridges gaps with adjacent disciplines, the policymaking community, and the larger field of international relations. Consistent with the purpose of this symposium, this essay will identify two general directions in which contemporary research on foreign policy is likely to proceed: (1) returning to being more comparative in
nature, and (2) developing a connection between constructivist research on identity and ideas and previous work in FPA. These directions are intended to be partly corrective in purpose as well as partly projective. A key goal is to project some emerging trends, although an attempt will be made to draw the distinction between what is already being done and the direction research will likely move in the future. This effort is unabashedly normative as well, given that it presents the author’s preferences for the particular research topics that the field should pursue.

A Return to Comparison

One of the most disappointing features of contemporary FPA is the relative dearth of comparative studies. If a researcher wants to investigate many of the traditional factors that explain foreign policy—factors such as a state’s position in the international system, the role of public opinion, political culture, state-society relations, and the impact of governmental organization—it is necessary to compare foreign policies across time, space, and issues to understand the general explanatory power of these various influences on governments’ behavior.

Policy questions demand this type of comparative knowledge. In the international debate over policy toward Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003, for example, one underlying question was: “What explains the French position as compared to the British position as compared to the German position as compared to the Turkish position?” The answers to this question were central to an understanding of the origin and outcome of the transatlantic division over policy toward Iraq. Foreign policy analysts certainly have potential responses to this question, but such inquiry has not been the focus of recent research.

In addition to aiding in policy-relevant research, comparison is the bedrock of many visions of analysis and of the scientific accumulation of knowledge. As James Rosenau (1968:308) argued in his seminal article that defined the study of foreign policy, it is “only by identifying similarities and differences in the external behavior of more than one national actor can analysis move beyond the particular case to higher levels of generalization.”

It was, of course, this Rosenauian view, embraced by many Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) scholars that would receive much criticism in subsequent years. Comparative foreign policy came to encompass many approaches including positivism, behavioralist epistemology, the inductive search for law-like generalizations in pursuit of grand theory, quantitative methodologies analyzing aggregate data, and a state-centric perspective. Because research in this subfield did not live up to early expectations and alternative epistemologies were advanced and accepted, CFP was largely discredited even by many of its own original founders (Kegley 1980; Smith 1986; Hermann and Peacock 1987; Hudson 1995; Carlssnaes 2002). The label “CFP” came close to being pejorative in nature.

In place of the CFP perspective, foreign policy analysts from the late 1970s until today have tended to adopt middle-range theoretical perspectives, to employ more qualitative methodologies, to emphasize contextual factors and caveats to making generalizations, and to avoid “if-then” hypotheses (Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995). This research proceeded largely through single-country studies overwhelmingly focused on the United States. The commitment to comparison was abandoned by most. Indeed, according to Steve Smith (1986:21),

even a quick glance through the literature will reveal that the vast majority of work on foreign policy consists of case studies of either a single-country’s foreign policy or an event or series of events. If we were to characterize the study of foreign policy as having a dominant approach, it would be this. Having said that, there is no uniformity on appropriate methods, nor on the variables to be studied.

Smith’s observation, made over fifteen years ago, holds true today.
The goal of generalization, however, has not been completely abandoned. Much current research is placed in the context of examining contending theoretical perspectives and of exploring factors that are traditionally considered to shape foreign policy and, thus, can contribute to theory building. Yet the field also needs more explicit comparisons across states, issues, and time periods within a single piece of research. With the growth of studies on the democratic peace, there have been more comparative studies, comparing democratic with nondemocratic states, for example, but most of this research is quantitative and statistical in nature and has some of the built-in positivist assumptions rejected by many foreign policy researchers long ago.2

Comparison need not, however, be in the form of large aggregate data sets amenable to statistical techniques. Comparison can also proceed through case studies following the guidelines that have been developed for making case study research more systematic (George 1979a; Ragin 1987; Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). Moreover, comparison can proceed with a focus on interpretation and understanding. Because a major theme of hermeneutic inquiry is that “action must always be understood from within” and must consider the socially constructed rules currently operating, one way to clarify how some actors have constituted their rules is to compare their views with how other actors understand their rules (Hollis and Smith 1990:72). According to Peter Katzenstein and his associates (1998:682), “the core of the constructivist project is to explicate variations in preferences, available strategies, and the nature of the players, across space and time.” Comparison of socially constructed rules, norms, and identities can also be made with counterfactuals. For instance, how might rules that are implicit in many interpretive analyses or with ideal types be constructed differently and in a way that is consistent with the Weberian tradition of Verstehen (Milliken 2001)?

On the theoretical front and in response to the dearth of comparative studies, Smith (1986:27) has proposed that “one promising way forward is to develop the comparative middle range theories that exist.” Along these lines, it is quite puzzling that two of the most influential middle-range theories in foreign policy—Allison’s bureaucratic and organizational models and Janis’s theory of groupthink—share the criticism that they are limited to US political structures (Wagner 1974; Caldwell 1977; ‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997). Investigations of the generalizability of these ideas have, for the most part, not been forthcoming.3 There are, however, examples of good research that do investigate middle-range theories from a comparative perspective. Consider Thomas Risse-Kappen’s (1991) study of domestic political structures as an intervening variable in the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, Joe Hagan’s (1993) research on the forms of political opposition and their impact on foreign behavior, and Marijke Breuning’s (1995) investigation of national role conceptions and foreign aid policy. All illustrate how comparative research can further our understanding of foreign policy.

Another type of comparison that seems largely missing from current FPA scholarship involves comparing a set of theoretical perspectives within a single study, particularly middle-range theories. Many studies of foreign policy seek to justify the inclusion of domestic or decision-making variables through a comparison to the grand theories of international relations, particularly realism. Even though this procedure provides for a useful way to speak to the larger field and careful comparisons can be highly instructive, many consumers of such research are already skeptical of the ability of these grand theories to explain foreign policy. It is

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2. Exceptions include Miriam Fendius Elman (1997) and the various critiques of the democratic peace that focus on demonstrating differences among democratic states.

this skepticism that motivated the development of FPA in the first place (Smith 1986).

Instead of preaching to the choir, FPA researchers would be better served by comparing the various theoretical perspectives that are currently part of their repertoire (bureaucratic politics versus groupthink, elite-dominated versus society-dominated foreign policy, leadership style versus leader beliefs, and so on). Such comparisons could be presented as tests of the relative explanatory power of different theories or, following Graham Allison (1971), as alternative “lenses” through which different variables become apparent when looking at the same policy or event (see Stern’s essay in this symposium).

Identity and Ideas

A comparative look at the contemporary foreign policies of major states (Beasley et al. 2002) reveals a struggle over identity and its influence on foreign policy. From Russia’s struggle to maintain its great power status in the post-Cold War era (D’Anieri 2002) to Germany’s concerns about transforming itself into a “normal” power (Lantis 2002), China’s struggle over its global identity (Ripley 2002), and India’s concern that its great-power self-identity has never been recognized by others (Pavri 2002), the questions “Who are we?” and “How are we perceived by others?” seem to be prominent factors influencing the external behavior of these states and their internal policymaking processes.

The issue of state identity and its effects on foreign policy is certainly reflected in current FPA scholarship. Following the criticisms leveled by international relations (IR) theorists against structural and material perspectives and their new focus on the role of norms and identity in world politics (Onuf 1989; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Wendt 1999), foreign policy analysts have also embraced concepts of state and national identity. Indeed, it is this development that most stands out across the past five years. Michael Barnett (1999), for example, explains Israeli participation in the Oslo peace process as a change in the way in which Israelis see themselves and their state. Thomas Banchoff (1999) advances Germany’s identity with Europe as the answer to the puzzle of why that country’s foreign policy has not followed the post-Cold War predictions of structural theories. Thomas Risse and his colleagues (1999) explain variations in French, German, and British policy toward the European monetary union in terms of differences among their national identities. Katzenstein’s (1996) edited volume on the role of norms and identity in national security policy was one of the first to seriously link identity and foreign policy. Most recently, Vendulka Kubálková and her associates (2001) have directly tackled the theoretical, empirical, and methodological challenges of a constructivist theory of foreign policy.

According to Brian White (1999:55), this interest in constructivism, and particularly in identity, comes as the nature of the state (especially the European state given EU integration) is changing:

> The key question, therefore, of how the new Europe as international actor might develop a strong collective identity and how that identity might be conceptualized should become one that concerns foreign policy analysts to a much greater extent than has hitherto been the case. There is an emerging literature on “collective identity formation” outside the field, in this case largely from the “constructivist” tradition which has an important contribution to make to understanding European foreign policymaking.

In addition to identity, the study of foreign policy has taken an ideational turn, also consistent with much of the constructivist perspective. The argument is made that foreign policy developments have origins in powerful ideas and beliefs. Building on the reflectivist approach, the editors of Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions, and Political Change (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:5) propose that “actions taken by human beings depend on the substantive quality of available ideas, since such ideas help to clarify principles and conceptions of causal relationships, and to coordinate individual behavior.” Similarly, Judith Goldstein (1988) has shown that beliefs, such as the belief in the efficacy of free trade, are powerful factors behind US foreign economic policy. Unfortunately, this research has been embraced primarily by international political economy and has not been fully incorporated into the mainstream literature of FPA.

Although the focus on identity did, indeed, begin in IR with the constructivist turn, those who have adapted this concept at the state level to explain foreign policy have been careful to distance themselves from the constructivist approach. Barnett (1999), for example, argues that constructivist theories fail to incorporate the insights of institutionalism, which assert that not only do actors strategize in an institutional setting, but identities are purposefully framed and manipulated in such a context. Similarly, Banchoff (1999) criticizes constructivist theories for not having developed an explanatory framework applicable to a wide range of cases and a method by which the content of state identity is specified. As constructivist approaches to the study of the foreign policy process and the concept of identity are increasingly employed in FPA, this distancing from constructivist roots is likely to continue. Identity explanations are likely to become “foreign policy-ized” by connecting identity to other factors and theories that have long been part of the FPA agenda. Three such connections seem particularly important and likely to be fruitful as part of a future research agenda.

First, a natural connection exists between state identity and previous research on role theory. Although Breuning (1995) argues that the concept of role has generally been interpreted in structural terms, Kal Holsti (1970) originally conceived of roles as both objectively defined role prescriptions and subjectively defined role conceptions. Holsti’s (1970:246) definition of role conceptions as “the image of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment” is remarkably similar to definitions of identity such as Barnett’s (1999:9) “understanding of oneself [or one’s state] in relationship to others.” Similarly, Banchoff (1999:268) proposes that “state identity refers to the self-placement of the polity within specific international contexts.” The role theory research (Wish 1980; Walker 1987) that followed these initial conceptualizations attempted to catalog various roles adopted by states and their effects on foreign policy as well as the sources or origins of national role conceptions. More specifically, Stephen Walker (1992:36) contends that “role identity theory . . . suggests how and why roles are selected when cues from others are conflicting, ambiguous, or absent,” and he applies these theoretical suggestions to Iraqi foreign policy. The connection between roles and identity has been made in some recent research; Glenn Chafetz and his associates (1996), for example, cite role theory and use the terms “role” and “identity” interchangeably. Yet, current scholarship on identity and its effects on foreign policy could benefit by more directly building on previous developments regarding role theory. In particular, past theorizing about the nature and content of roles, the conditions under which they affect foreign policy, and the sources of roles could help direct future research on identity and prevent the reinvention of the “role-identity wheel.”

Second, research on identity and foreign policy could make better use of psychological research, just as studies of beliefs, images, and decision making have in FPA’s past. Although many who use the concept of identity try to avoid the individual or psychological level of analysis, identity remains a fundamentally psychological concept in that it concerns the ways in which people (or states) view themselves (see Kowert 2002). Because identity is social in nature, it concerns the self in relationship with others—the very topic of social psychology. Indeed, one of the main developments in social psychology over the last decade and a half has been
a renewed focus on groups and group relationships, hence the rise of Social Identity Theory (see, for example, Tajfel 1981; Turner 1987; Hogg and Abrams 1990). This research on social identities investigates some of the very assumptions and questions that are currently being discussed in analyses of identity in the study of foreign policy. The origins of identity (motivational versus cognitive, for example), the context-dependent nature of identities, the impact of identity on group relations and on the processing of information about groups, and the management of multiple identities are common subjects of this psychological research. To be sure, some scholarship in FPA does include reference to this body of work (for example, Bloom 1990; Chaifetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1996; Risse et al. 1999; Hopf 2002), but particular propositions on identity conflict, identity change, and group relations based on theoretical frameworks and empirical research from adjacent disciplines have yet to be fully articulated and investigated.

The term “identity” is not the only psychological concept that can be found in research on identity and foreign policy. Associated concepts such as “frames,” “framing,” “narratives,” and reasoning about “critical events” also have their connections to contemporary psychological studies. This research from social psychology has made its way into FPA in studies on risk taking (for example, Vertzberger 1998), media influences (for example, Nacos et al. 2000), and analogical and other modes of reasoning (for example, Sylvan, Ostrom, and Gannon 1994), but it has yet to be capitalized on in the identity literature.

Work on the role of ideas and beliefs in foreign policy can also be more successfully integrated with psychological research on belief systems. Goldstein (1988:182, 184), for example, in her study on US foreign trade policy, argues that “the belief system of those individuals who enforce laws” is a critical factor along with the “cognitive bases for US policy.” Nevertheless, she chooses to examine the content of the idea, not the cognitive processes. Indeed Goldstein and Keohane (1993:7) in their role as editors of a book on ideas in foreign policy explain their choice not to build on psychological research stating: “This volume . . . is concerned not with the implications of cognitive psychology for interpretation of reality but with another facet of the role of ideas. We focus on the impact of particular beliefs—shared by large numbers of people—about the nature of their worlds that have implications for human action.”

Although these choices are certainly justifiable, they indicate that most studies of ideas and foreign policy have not built upon the very solid body of FPA scholarship concerning leaders’ beliefs and their impact on foreign policy processes and outputs.4 One of the strongest contributions foreign policy analysts have made to our understanding of world politics is that leaders’ beliefs about their environment and the cognitive processes that affect how new information is processed and incorporated into existing belief systems provide important explanations for foreign policy choices. The study of belief systems has stood the test of time. From research on leaders’ operational codes (for example, Leites 1951; O. Holsti 1970; Walker 1977; George 1979b; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998), enemy images (for example, White 1968; Holsti 1976a; Herrmann 1988), psychological lenses (Brecher 1972), misperceptions (Jervis 1976), cognitive maps (Axelrod 1976), attitudes (Larson 1985), and analogies (Khong 1992), most FPA scholars have become convinced that leaders’ beliefs can be a powerful explanation of foreign policy, particularly with regard to specific foreign policy choices and in crisis situations. Even though there remains healthy debate about alternative theoretical

4. One notable exception is Martha Cottam’s (1986) research on US images of dependent states, such as Mexico, and how these images affect all areas of policy, including energy and economic negotiations.
perspectives that can be used to understand belief system dynamics (for example, consistency theory, cognitive dissonance, attribution theory, and schemas or other information processing perspectives) and a diversity in the methods used to assess beliefs and their impact on foreign policy, the importance of leaders’ perceptions and beliefs cannot be denied.

Third, research on foreign policy and identity can easily be placed in the context of institutional decision making and domestic influences on foreign policy and, thus, be connected to long-standing research traditions in FPA. Even though most conceptualizations of identity focus on the collective and shared nature of identity in a societal or political culture, analysts typically retreat to the collective elite because they assess identity through elite statements. Although such a procedure is certainly understandable on methodological grounds and often justifiable on theoretical and empirical grounds as well, the connection between elite and mass identities and the influence processes between the masses and elites is usually assumed. A large amount of research in FPA, however, can speak directly to these questions. When elite and mass identities are in conflict, for example, studies on the influence of public opinion on leaders (for example, Page and Shapiro 1983; Foyle 1997; Shapiro and Jacobs 2000), the manipulation of public opinion by leaders (for example, Margolis and Mauser 1989; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990), and the government structures that link society and opposition groups to leaders (for example, Risse-Kappen 1991; Hagan 1993) become applicable.

Although Barnett (1999), in his incorporation of the key insights of institutionalism, does discuss the political opportunity structures that allow some identities to prevail over others, he does not extend the relationship between opportunity structures and identities beyond the Israeli case, other than to say structures and institutions matter. When identities are in conflict within institutions, insights from research on bureaucratic (Allison 1971; Stern and Verbeek 1998), organizational (Steinbruner 1974; Bovens and ’t Hart 1996), and small group processes (Maoz 1990a; Kaarbo and Beasley 1998) regarding how such differences can be negotiated and resolved are relevant and could further “FPA-ize” the study of identity. Indeed, Smith (2001:52–53) argues that important distinctions between “Wendt-style” and “Onuf-style” constructivism exist, observing that the latter is particularly amenable to using insights from foreign policy research regarding the effects of domestic politics.

The upshot of all this is that whereas Wendtian social construction offers little room for domestic political influences on foreign policy (it is, after all, self-consciously a structural theory), the version adopted by Onuf opens up the possibility for exactly this kind of domestic influence. Indeed, it positively requires examination of domestic influence because of how it sees collective social actors gaining agency. In this sense, all agents follow rules because they live in a world that is socially constructed by these rules.

This view of the social world fits well with the foreign policy analysis literature. That literature focuses on the linkage between social structures and calculating agents. Bureaucratic politics, for example, seems almost a paradigmatic example of social constructivism. In short, FPA looks at the interface between institutions, agents, and rules with the aim of showing how these led to the foreign policy choices made by the collective agents known as states.

Some of the explorations of the power of ideas have taken the role of institutions—how beliefs create institutions and how institutions affect the transmission of beliefs—more seriously than have studies on identity (see, for example, Goldstein 1988; Katzenstein 1993). This research on the role of institutions could, however, also be extended to the larger political setting, incorporating more directly previous foreign policy analysis on the linkages between state and society and state and opposition.
Conclusions

This essay is not meant to be a critique of FPA. Indeed, there is real promise in current developments on two fronts—studies involving institutional perspectives and those focused on leadership—as they link to the previous discussion of comparison, identity, and ideas.

In terms of institutionalism, FPA seems to be drifting away from the pure psychological explanations that came to dominate much of the literature from the late 1970s through the 1980s. Although information processing and group dynamics approaches added important dimensions to our understanding of foreign policymaking, the picture that emerged was one void of politics. The role of political games, mixed motives, political strategies, jurisdictions, and conflict over goals and means was, at most, in the background in much of the foreign policy scholarship. Recent research, however, has taken politics and institutional context more seriously. Brian Ripley (1995) used research on organizational culture and social cognition to discuss the importance of procedural scripts and symbolism in foreign policymaking. In a manner similar to earlier research by Zeev Maoz (1990b), Paul Hoyt and Jean Garrison (1997) have looked at the manipulation of information and procedures by foreign policy actors in their call for a political perspective in foreign policy analysis (see also Hoyt 1997; Garrison 1999). Each of these studies recognizes that institutions offer both opportunities and constraints to the actors embedded within them (Carlsnaes 1992, 1994).

Another promising development lies in the study of leadership. In particular, the careful and systematic research that is emerging from use of at-a-distance techniques is addressing crucial questions with regard to the impact of leaders’ characteristics, beliefs, and experiences on foreign policy. Walker and his associates (1999), for example, have assessed how autonomous beliefs are in the face of different situational constraints and how consistent beliefs are with behavior. These same authors (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998) have also investigated the validity of at-a-distance measures of operational code beliefs. Moreover, a recent symposium in Political Psychology (September 2000) explored a range of methodological issues connected with at-a-distance research (for more on this point, see Mark Schafer’s essay in this symposium). Tackling some of the common methodological objections to individual approaches to foreign policy is a significant development for the field of FPA.

If future research takes the paths outlined in this essay, it will likely be situated in and speak to the institutional and leadership perspectives found in current scholarship. With such developments, foreign policy analysts will continue to build bridges within and outside their field.


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As commonly defined, international politics as a field examines the sources of conflict and cooperation between and among states and international actors within the international system. As a distinct branch of international politics, foreign policy analysis (FPA) considers a specific aspect of this larger question by focusing on the processes by which specific international actors (primarily state governments and
leaders) make choices. Tracing back to the classic work of Richard Snyder and his collaborators (1962), the result has been an enormous literature on “how leaders, groups, and coalitions of actors can affect the way foreign policy problems are framed, the options that are selected, the choices that are made, and what gets implemented” (Hermann 2001b:1).

In the coming years, the challenge for FPA will be to integrate ongoing transformations in international political structures and processes into theories regarding government processes and individual behaviors. During this transformative period, new processes will likely develop both across and within traditional state boundaries while at the same time the main actors will probably remain the same. As such, FPA will need to develop new understandings regarding the nature of policymaking among the various actors who create foreign policy.

As for the international system, several overarching future visions of world politics have come to dominate popular intellectual discussion. Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) “End of History” view suggests that liberalism, democracy, and the latter’s emphasis on individual rights have triumphed ideologically over all competitors. In this vision, the future path of international affairs is an increasingly peaceful coexistence in a slowly enlarging democratic zone with potential conflicts existing between the democratic and nondemocratic zones. An apocalyptic vision comes from Robert Kaplan’s (2000) analysis in which he suggests that societal breakdown in the developing world (characterized by poverty, inequality, instability, and strife) will eventually spread to the developed world and encompass the entire globe. Samuel Huntington (1996) expects conflict to emerge among various cultural civilizations (Islamic, Judeo-Christian, Eastern Orthodox, and Confucian) in a manner that at once potentially supercedes loyalties to the state internally while at the same time providing affiliative motivations among states within a particular civilization. Thomas Friedman (1999) identifies globalization associated with the free flow of economic goods and services across the globe as the key international variable. Nations that embrace globalization will thrive; those that do not will wither. While pointing to traditional balance of power considerations as a continuing foundation for international relations, Charles Kupchan (2002: 318–319) believes that international politics and internal state dynamics will increasingly be affected in unpredictable ways by digital technology’s influence on productivity, economies of scale, and the creation of “atomized and individualized” modes of production. And, John Mearsheimer (2001) emphasizes the continued dominance of the balance of power and state competition in an anarchical world.

Although an analysis of these competing analytical perspectives lies beyond the scope of this essay, they provide a useful starting point. Except for Mearsheimer’s view, one commonality among these various perspectives is the notion that in the future there will be greater movement of capital, people, ideas, and goods across increasingly porous international borders. The challenge for FPA will be to adapt to these increasingly dynamic processes. This essay argues that to do so FPA will need to further integrate into its examination of foreign policy formulation the expanded opportunities that exist for pressure from the public, world opinion, and globalized citizens. The changing international context will require that the field emphasize the influence of cross-border foreign policy processes as well as exploit data sets that have not been previously used (see the discussion of comparison by Kaarbo in this symposium). Ironically, while the barriers to participation by actors outside traditional political systems recede, attention to the importance of policymakers, and the foreign policy processes they employ, in mediating these pressures should grow.

**Comparative Public Opinion**

By the mid-1970s, the received knowledge regarding US public opinion and foreign policy held that the public was largely inattentive, emotional, with
unstructured beliefs, and little influence on foreign policy. The foreign policy failure of Vietnam led to a reexamination of these conceptions and eventually led to a reformulation of most of these views. In subsequent years, scholars clearly demonstrated that the public reacted reasonably to foreign policy events, held structured attitudes, and seemed to influence policy (Holsti 1992). In the last decade, scholars have trained their attention on specifying the conditions that determine the public’s influence and on a widening array of potential intervening variables (Graham 1994; Powlick and Katz 1998; Foyle 1999).

Even though much progress has been made in our understanding of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, most of this scholarship has occurred substantively about the United States. Although some attention was previously paid to examining the effects of different types of domestic structures (Eichenberg 1989; Risse-Kappen 1991), the literature has only recently begun to test whether the revisionist views on public opinion and foreign policy apply in non-US contexts (for example, Bjereld and Ekengren 1999; Isernia 2000; La Balme 2000; Sinnott 2000; Isernia, Juhasz, and Rattinger 2002). Still, this comparative research has examined mostly data from advanced industrialized democracies in western Europe. The challenge is to push beyond this data set to become even more broadly comparative in order to understand which aspects of the previous knowledge are structurally inherent within democratic contexts and which are context bound—based on specific institutional arrangements, levels of democratic development, or cultural factors. Future evaluations of previous findings in reference to nontraditional data sources, such as developing countries, could yield startling results (Aydinli and Mathews 2000).

In this field in particular, given that much of what we know about public opinion and foreign policy at both the theoretical and empirical level was developed in reference to the United States and tested only in a limited manner beyond it, we need to do more comparative analysis. Because scientific polling was begun in the US context when the United States was already an advanced democracy, our concepts about the use of public opinion and the process of how polling and public opinion became institutionalized in the political process (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995) may be context bound to one country. For example, it is very possible that in developing democracies the roles of individuals and the institutionalization of polling will interact in a way that is not anticipated by the US literature (see, for example, Zilberman 2002). Because democratization and the institutionalization of public opinion polling are occurring at the same time, teasing out causal mechanisms will also be particularly challenging. Still, given the long history within FPA of grappling with just such questions methodologically (George 1979a; George and McKeown 1985; Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995; Kaarbo and Beasley 1999), the field is well positioned to provide insights into these issues.

Although difficult, sorting out these problems empirically is an important task not only for scholarly reasons but for applied politics as well. For instance, the democracy and war literature has pointed to potential differences in behavior between developed democracies and those that are in the process of democratizing (see, for example, Mansfield and Snyder 1995). In a similar vein, we might expect that public opinion and its influence on foreign policy could vary in significant ways that would be theoretically and practically significant. Consider that, even though Western democracies have both elections and traditions of liberalism, many developing democracies are better characterized as illiberal democracies because they lack an emphasis on the rule of law and basic political freedoms (Zakaria 2003). This distinction becomes particularly important when we try to understand why it is that politicians pay attention to public opinion: whether as a result of the practical need to win elections, or of some broader ideational or normative process. Future FPA research should help find the answer.
Transnational Processes and World Opinion

Beyond the influence of public opinion within a single state, the emerging international system will require FPA to give greater attention to cross-national processes that influence decisions. Although much of the current literature focuses on how domestic society, governmental politics, and foreign policy processes affect a particular state’s foreign policy choices, greater emphasis will need to be placed in the future on the role of world opinion, the cross-state influence of domestic actors (state A responding to state B’s public), and the activities of globalized citizens.

Discussions concerning the potential influence of world opinion on policy go back a long way. Consider the emphasis Woodrow Wilson placed on it when he argued that the opinion of the world’s publics would force post-World War I states into more pacific relations based on openness and international agreements. Although history certainly proved Wilson’s vision incorrect or at least ill-timed, the case can be made that the influential world opinion that he envisioned is likely to become increasingly significant in a globalized world. The effects of world opinion are, however, not likely to be uniformly stabilizing or peace inducing and instead will depend greatly on the context.

World opinion has long been a source of concern for policymakers. For example, attention to world opinion existed within US President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration even at the height of the Cold War when realist concerns such as power and position were thought to predominate. Two instances illustrate how concerns with world opinion constrained the Eisenhower Administration from pursuing actions that policymakers might have thought prudent for purely national security reasons. First, early in the administration, both Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles concurred that they could not use nuclear weapons as an effective instrument of policy because of the constraints of world opinion (Memorandum of Discussion, Special Meeting of the NSC on March 31, 1953). Subsequent deliberations on the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina and during the Taiwan Straits crises suggest that concerns about world opinion continued to limit their use. Second, in their deliberations about US policy toward the Offshore Islands in the Taiwan Straits in the period immediately before the 1954 crisis, the meeting notes record that Eisenhower (after observing that the world did not favor US belligerence to preserve the islands) did not desire to become “involved in a major war where world public opinion would be wholly against the United States, because that, he said, was the kind of war you lose. World public opinion was a tremendous force to be reckoned with” (Memorandum of Discussion, August 18, 1954). Even though one could argue that the reason world opinion was important was based on geopolitical calculations focused on winning the hearts and minds of the world’s citizens in the Cold War’s ideological struggle, the context of the discussion hints that world opinion might require greater consideration in FPA. In the current international situation, world opinion seems poised to influence policy through global norms (Barkan 2000) and internationalized legal processes (Glaberson 2001) as well as through direct expressions of public sentiment.

Assuming that the world becomes even more globalized and barriers to the movement of persons, material, capital, and ideas among states are increasingly removed, members of the public are likely to become more aware of and concerned with the substance and processes involved in policymakers in foreign countries. When the bottom line for multinational corporations depends on the behavior and choices of governments and individuals from around the globe, self-interested persons will likely make financial and investment choices based on their perceptions of the state of the economy and politics in these other countries. One only needs to look at the global financial crisis during 1997–1998 to see the potential influence that groups of individual investors can have on national economies. Given that state economies will likely become increasingly more dependent on the choices of a large
number of individuals who are stateless with respect to their financial loyalties, leaders and foreign policymakers at all levels will have to become increasingly responsive to the attitudes of citizens in countries other than their own if they are to remain successful.

State actors already are beginning to consider globalized forces and internationalized actors (for example, bond markets, international investors, tourist travel money, global norms, and so on). To formulate foreign policy successfully, leaders increasingly must anticipate and react to these forces. As a result, FPA needs to become responsive to this chain of events by focusing even more on cross-national bureaucratic, public, interest group, and decision-making dynamics. Although those analyzing foreign policymaking probably will continue to study decision makers in governments, our attention to how these actors perceive and choose to interact with each other should shift, emphasizing the broader context and these expanded processes.

The public will likely seize upon this transformation in context as well. On numerous issues ranging from landmines, free trade, environmental policy, and labor standards, citizens of the world have begun to think in a manner consistent with the notion of world opinion and have acted to influence the choices of national leaders (Deibert 2000; Edwards and Gaventa 2001). To a certain extent, the technology of the Internet is beginning to allow individuals to conduct their own foreign policies and exact costs upon nation-states whose policies displease them. For example, after the United States spy plane incident with China in early 2001, reports surfaced regarding Internet attacks on US sites from individuals in China and on Chinese web sites by US citizens as a form of protest (Becker 2001). The protest movement in the United States against the 2003 Iraq war also employed unique “denial of service” attacks against the Congress by inundating both traditional telephone lines and e-mail accounts with expressions of opposition to the war as well as employing the Internet as an organizational tool for more traditional street protests. Individuals are beginning to act as globalized citizens, evidencing in some circumstances more loyalty to broader concepts than to their individual states.

The questions scholars will need to address center around the growing potential of world opinion. At the most basic level, what is world opinion? Should we conceive of it as a new entity different from traditional public opinion within nation-states? If so, what causes it to emerge and what are the determinants of its influence? Does it have an influence, or is it just more of a nuisance to policymakers? Or, is it just an echo of the chimera of world opinion that Woodrow Wilson referred to in the beginning of the previous century? What are the processes through which world opinion acts? Are some methods more effective in influencing policy than others? Are individuals shifting their loyalties from the traditional nation-state to a more globalized perspective? What are the implications of such a shift for policy processes and outcomes?

The Individual and Foreign Policy Processes

As technology progresses, the power in the hands of individual citizens to react to the foreign policies of nation-states could influence traditional state leaders to alter their policies accordingly. Interestingly, it was clear in the 2003 United States–Iraq war that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s strategy for defeating the United States, despite dramatic substantive disparities in military capabilities, relied on public opinion within the United States and broader world opinion. Emboldened in part by large demonstrations around the globe against US intervention, Hussein apparently concluded that world opinion could spur national actors to restrain the United States. Barring that, he hoped that his forces could inflict such large casualties that public opinion within the United States would cause US forces to
withdraw. He also appears to have counted on world opinion, and Arab opinion in particular, to react to devastation in Iraq in a manner that would thwart US action (Gordon 2003a, 2003b). This interpretation of what happened is interesting for two reasons. First, given the factors that normally determine US public support for conflict—such as the interests at stake, policy objectives, acting with an ally, elite consensus, and costs (both financial and human) relative to threat (Klarevas 2002), Hussein appears to have fundamentally misread the US domestic situation. Second, President George W. Bush seems to have been rather impervious to considerations of world public opinion. After massive international protests against possible US action in February 2003, Bush noted that “size of protest—it’s like deciding, well, I’m going to decide policy based upon a focus group. The role of a leader is to decide policy based upon security, in this case, the security of the people. . . . Evidently, some of the world doesn’t view Saddam Hussein as a risk to peace. I respectfully disagree” (Stevenson 2003:A1). This difference in views regarding world public opinion points to another important area for further investigation: the role of the individual policymaker in mediating the societal influences of public and world opinion.

Although much attention recently has focused on the role that domestic politics play in shaping foreign policy, most of the work outside of FPA has emphasized the importance of domestic structure and society at the expense of the policymaker. Future research should emphasize the role of the individual and decision-making processes in mediating societal pressures (discussed in the previous section) because the future environment will likely allow even greater room for individual and governmental process variability. An increasingly globalized international environment provides foreign policy leaders with a new set of institutional actors that they need to consider. Although it is now common to argue that domestic political calculations influence foreign policy choices (see, for example, Putnam 1988; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Fearon 1994; Milner 1997; Auerswald 2000), these analyses currently tend to assume that leaders react in an undifferentiated manner to domestic pressures. However, even though these pressures are likely to be experienced by all policymakers, leaders should not be expected to react in the same manner to such pressures (see, for example, Holsti 1976a, 1976b; Hermann and Hagan 1998; Greenstein 2000; Byman and Pollack 2001).

For instance, when scholars argue that foreign policy leaders consider electoral factors in their choices, it is often assumed that all foreign policy officials calculate and react to these pressures in the same way. However, research on the influence of public opinion on the foreign policy decisions of US presidents suggests that even though all presidents are generally aware of the public, interest group, and electoral incentives and the costs involved in a foreign policy choice, systematic and predictable variation in responses to these pressures exists across individuals (Foyle 1999). In short, a large body of literature indicates that we need to factor in how individual leaders perceive, interpret, and react to pressures from society across states with similar and varying institutional structures and within a single state (for example, Hermann and Kegley 1995; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Rosati 2000).

With increasing globalization, FPA will be critical in sorting out the interactions among the international, domestic, and individual levels of analysis and their effect on policy. Just as some business leaders have proven adept at seizing the implications of the new opportunities provided by shifts in technology, some political leaders embrace avenues to enhance their political fortunes; others try and fail; and still others sense no opportunity at all (Hagan 1994). For these reasons, FPA needs to become increasingly attentive to the cross-national nature of domestic political influences and to non-US cases—an effort that is already underway (Beasley et al. 2001; Stern and Sundelius 2002).
In addition, the radical change in technology associated with computers and the Internet, rather than undermining the role of leaders in formulating foreign policy, might just enhance their ability to ascertain, anticipate, and respond to world opinion if they can creatively marshal the new technologies to their ends. The response of business leaders to the Internet might be instructive. Unlike the dot-com failures, many established companies combined traditional business methods with the new technologies to enhance their connections with customers and expand their businesses (Kurtzman and Rifkin 2001). Similarly, the US military employed the Internet in its information warfare plan in the 2003 war against Iraq, albeit with limited results (Shanker and Schmitt 2003).

In the future, perceptive leaders might use the Internet as a diplomatic tool in yet unforeseen ways to enhance their connections to their citizens and the citizens of other nations (Dizard 2001). Although government web sites exist that provide both information and opportunities to “e-mail the leader,” none have employed the web as an additional force in governance on the scale adopted in business. As the speed and complexity of international politics increases, leaders could find that traditional methods of assessing citizen sentiment (polling, elections, letters, press, and so on) do not adequately address their needs in determining the intensity and nuance of public attitudes. Emerging evidence suggests that within the United States presidents already employing these tools to measure public opinion are doing so in a differentiated manner (Murray and Howard 2002). Just as some businesses have successfully seized upon the Internet as a means to enhance their traditional functions, the web could serve such a purpose for leaders in a globalized future. Although some have claimed that the increasing speed of media communications hamstrings policymakers, the data suggest that the media’s need for instant news allows savvy politicians to shape the message in a manner previously unthinkable (Strobel 1997). Similarly, the Internet provides an opportunity for creative politicians to interact with world opinion in ways limited only by their imagination.

If this broader effort proves successful, FPA will have a great deal to offer to proponents of the study of strategic interaction and constructivism in understanding international politics. By emphasizing how individuals and governments interact with each other in a specified institutional context, the strategic interaction–rational choice literature places an emphasis on outcomes, given a certain specified set of preferences, rather than on process. Joseph Lepgold and Alan Lamborn (2001) have recently argued that strategic choice and cognitive approaches have much to gain from scholarly interaction and that cognitive theories could benefit from engaging the strategic environment to a greater extent. Other foreign policy analysts have also begun to move in this direction (Hagan and Hermann 2001; Hermann 2001a; Walker 2003).

Foreign policy analysis can also provide important assistance to the strategic interaction literature by assessing where foreign policy preferences come from and how these preferences are translated into policies. Strategic interaction research at the international level largely takes preferences as given and assumes that the transmission from preferences into outcomes is mediated by the institutional environment, the configuration of the actors’ preferences, and their strategic behavior given these factors. When domestic politics are included in these models, assumptions are made about the preferences of various domestic actors. Outcomes are then analyzed by examining how the preferences of the various actors interact within a specified domestic institutional environment. Because the factors (that is, the preferences of either states or actors within states) that strategic choice theorists take as given are exactly the factors on which FPA focuses (that is, the origin of preferences), there is no reason that these two approaches necessarily conflict. In fact, some scholars (for example, Bueno de Mesquita 2002) with a strategic interaction perspective are now emphasizing the need to examine domestic
processes, providing an opening for intellectual engagement between these two approaches to research.

In short, strategic choice theorists can assist foreign policy scholars in examining the transition from policy choice to outcome while FPA can provide strategic choice theorists assistance in explaining the elusive question of where preferences (whether of individuals, groups, or governments) come from. In addition, some FPA scholars (for example, Schafer and Crichlow 2002) have begun to link the quality of the decision process with the quality of the international outcome in a systematic fashion. In this interaction, foreign policy analysts would do well by identifying and specifying how and when their theories are most relevant as has been attempted in the past (Holsti 1976b; Hermann and Hagan 1998).

Constructivists contend that ideas matter a great deal in determining international behavior by shaping how concepts such as anarchy, international norms, and shared beliefs about the direction of the world are understood in the world community (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996). In the US context, evidence suggests that these ideational factors are, indeed, quite important in shaping the US approach to foreign policy in a manner that connects individual level variables with international behavior. Recent analyses of US foreign policy have pointed to the importance of national identity and its effect in transcending political perspectives within the United States (Nau 2002; Kagan 2003). In turn, the US identity as expressed in the foreign policies of the United States interacts in interesting ways with the identities of other states having varying ideational foundations. Although these perspectives point to a generalized identity that all US foreign policymakers are said to share, Walter Russell Mead (2002) has outlined several competing foreign policy identities that exist within the United States. Depending on the identities of the individuals in power and the political coalitions within the government, different approaches to US foreign policy emerge. What is interesting in all these perspectives is the similarity to concepts within FPA—such as the operational code (George 1979b; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), image theory (Herrmann et al. 1997; Schafer 1997), problem representation (Sylvan and Voss 1998), and worldview (Hagan 1994; Young and Schafer 1998). Given these tools, FPA would seem to have much to offer ideational perspectives by systematically analyzing the sources, structure, and effects of these competing perspectives on foreign policymaking.

**Conclusion**

Just as the real world of international politics is becoming increasingly globalized and interactive, scholarship in FPA needs to do the same. With regard to study of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, we should encourage greater engagement with the domestic contexts in which public opinion forms and attempts to affect policy. Similarly, the exploration of whether and how the emerging process of world opinion influences policy should become a focus of attention. Finally, FPA’s understanding of individual decision processes could form the basis for productive conversations with scholars engaged in examining strategic interaction and interested in approaching the study of international relations from a constructivist perspective. On all these fronts, foreign policy analysts currently have both the conceptual and methodological tools to contribute to the exploration of important international political questions. Let the work begin.
Science, Empiricism, and Tolerance in the Study of Foreign Policymaking

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This essay focuses on various practices in research in the field of international relations (IR) in general and foreign policy analysis (FPA) in particular. These practices shape our research programs today as they have in the past and are quite certain to do in the future. The kinds of questions and issues raised in this essay are hardly novel but are worthwhile revisiting in the context of thinking about the next twenty years in the field. Two related themes are developed in the essay. The first is the importance of tolerance with regard to both subfields and methodological approaches. The second revolves around the importance of empirical research in general and as a way to begin to answer the fundamental questions posed by our debates.

Tolerance versus Naysaying

This essay is written from the perspective of someone in the field of foreign policymaking, a field with a rich history. Richard Snyder and his associates (1962) are often cited for their seminal contributions to this field, but many other classic works could be cited (Leites 1951; George 1969; O. Holsti 1970; Janis 1972; Hermann 1974; Jervis 1976; Cottam 1977; and many others). Within this field, the present author places himself even more specifically in the subfield of political psychology. Those of us in that subfield look at such things as how the psychology of individuals affects policy and how the dynamics of small groups can help or hinder the decision-making process. These concepts are reasonably intuitive and make some sense to many casual observers in government, the media, and even the masses. Within the academy, however, plenty of naysayers remain.

Some argue that individual-level phenomena are simply irrelevant in the bigger world of state and global politics—“bigger” things matter much more in the latter arena. Some schools of thought say we need to understand state-level characteristics, most notably the power and interests of the states involved (Morgenthau 1948). Other schools say that even the state is too low a level of analysis in terms of understanding global politics, that instead we need to know the configuration of the “system” (Waltz 1979). Sometimes people within these schools accept the general idea that the individual level might provide some value-added, marginal increases in explained variance, but, they suggest, it is much more parsimonious to operate on the “higher” levels of analysis.

Yet other schools of thought, the ones based on the assumptions of rationality and the methods of formal modeling (for example, Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Stein 1990), offer a different kind of criticism of the relevance of political psychology to the study of foreign policymaking. Scholars in these schools often operate on the state level even though the concepts that they use are easily reduced to the individual level. Their argument is not so much about the correct level of analysis as about how state or human behavior can only be understood through formal mathematical modeling based on the simple idea that actors work rationally to maximize their utility. This argument is essentially the polar opposite of that made in political psychology. Formal modelers assume that actors are all fundamentally the same; we need only understand the parameters of a situation to calculate the next move. Political psychologists, on the other hand, assume that actors are
fundamentally different; we need to understand these differences, and their effect on behavior, to predict an actor’s next move.

The point in providing these short, thumbnail sketches of some different schools of thought is to point out that these debates exist in IR now. We as individuals see great stakes in defending our own positions in these debates; as a result, it is highly probable that even twenty years from now these debates—or variations on them—will be alive and well. Moreover, such debates themselves are healthy for the field. They increase our own critical and theoretical thinking; they offer different perspectives and explanations; they cause us to respond to criticism through further research and more rigorous investigation. Furthermore, even though some of these schools of thought seem to be at fundamental odds with each other, that is not necessarily the case. Let us take the divide between rational-actor and political-psychology approaches noted above. There may, indeed, be a middle ground, or perhaps a blending of the two schools that brings us closer to reality than either approach does separately. Actors may strive for rationality and may, within the bounds of their own mental limitations, think they are acting rationally. Assessing likely moves by individuals based on assumptions of rationality may, therefore, be a good starting place for our theories and explanations and may in fact account for a large amount of variance in behavior. Assessing psychological motivations and cognitive distortions—psychological variables—may, however, explain the many deviations from rationality and, as a result, provide us with an even richer understanding of behavior. Thus, an argument can be made that it is probably not the case that one school is right and the other is wrong.

What is problematic in these debates, however, is the extent to which individuals get overly involved in defending their own perspectives. Reasons for this behavior certainly exist. Given the competitive, intellectual nature of the academy and the stakes involved, we hardly want our own perspective—the one we have invested so much of our career in—to be diminished or dismissed. But what seems to result from this territoriality is intolerance, provincialism, hostility, and anger as well as reduced communication across schools of thought. According to Webster, a “naysayer” is one who denies, refuses, or opposes something. Although constructive, critical dialogue is beneficial and necessary for the intellectual growth of IR, naysaying would appear generally counterproductive.

One more point needs to be made on this notion of criticism and naysaying. The above comments refer generally to theoretical debates within IR. But we might usefully ask if it is not, for example, an empirical question how rational and psychological models might be combined to better explain behavior. The time spent debating questions theoretically would seem better spent studying the effects empirically. Empirical investigation can tell us the various influences of factors coming from the individual, state, and system levels of analysis. Even though theoretical thinking is critical, the resulting questions essentially demand empirical answers.

**Normal Science**

Thomas Kuhn (1970:10), of course, provided us with the concept of “normal science.” He stated that “‘normal science’ means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation of its practice.” The concept of “continuation” is inherent in Kuhn’s definition; normal science is the practice of building today upon the methods and findings of yesterday. Scientific communities, according to Kuhn, are great socializers, and the practice of scientific inquiry is strongly a social-psychological phenomenon. Mentors teach protégés the rules, norms, standards, and accepted practices of their research traditions. The protégés, having adopted these norms, become psychologically invested in them and committed to their endurance. Protégés later become
mentors, and the process repeats itself. Kuhn’s description of the practice of science has been called into question by a number of critics (for example, Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977). These critics have generally focused on the historical veracity (or lack thereof) of Kuhn’s description of revolutionary science or, in other words, the process whereby too many anomalies exist for the current paradigm and so alternative theories and practices are proffered. It is likely that all academics have felt the normalizing effects that Kuhn referred to as normal science. We have felt these influences from graduate committees, journal editors and referees, and colleagues as well as in faculty meetings. Throughout our careers, there have been times when the discipline has imposed its rules, norms, standards, and accepted practices on us, much to our chagrin. We can expect that in twenty years we will continue to see things like Kuhn’s description of normal science at work in IR. So let us consider the benefits and drawbacks to such practices.

The drawbacks are well known and well rehearsed as we all look back to our philosophy of science classes in graduate school. Normal science constrains intellectual inquiry. Accepted methodologies are thrust upon us; assumptions are not to be questioned; concepts are already well defined and accepted; we are even encouraged to limit the kinds of research questions we ask. It seems commonplace to advise students to “find a research tradition you like in the literature and build upon it; but do not stray too far.” The point is not to discredit such advice, but rather to remind us all of how our practices and socialization procedures (1) contribute to normal science and (2) place limitations on the things that get studied and the ways that they get studied.

Karl Popper (1970:53) leveled a particularly articulate criticism at normal science when he observed:

In my view the “normal” scientist, as Kuhn describes him, is a person one ought to be sorry for. . . . The “normal” scientist . . . has been badly taught. He has been taught in a dogmatic spirit; he is a victim of indoctrination. He has learned a technique which can be applied without asking for the reasons why.

Popper is correct, at least in part, in that these practices do indeed limit intellectual inquiry. Disciplines do just that at times: they discipline. When do we intellectually dismiss a particular research program because it threatens our core practices and beliefs? When do we stifle creative new approaches or ideas because “there is no basis for it in the literature”? When do we encourage bright students to work in a “more accepted” area because it will be easier to get a job? When do we reject new ideas simply because we do not understand them?

Given these kinds of criticisms of normal science, how can one argue that such practices have some benefits? The argument is a simple one. Foreign policy analysis benefits from the cumulative nature of our research. It is helpful when we build upon previous research and existing methodologies. We contribute to the existing threads of dialogue, meaning that we can add new ideas and evidence without having to start at the beginning. We do not have to reinvent the wheel. Moreover, we gain a certain level of trust in those who preceded us—in their intellect and insights, in their methods and integrity, in their wisdom. Our predecessors may not have found all the right answers, but we can benefit by building upon their ideas and findings. They may or may not have been brilliant; they may or may not have used the best methodology; they may or may not have always been on the most advantageous road. These things do not matter so much as the fact that our predecessors put thought and care into their work and provided us with more knowledge than existed before them. Current work benefits from the fruit of their research, and in the end a cumulation of knowledge occurs.

One example in FPA is research on the operational code, a construct originated by Nathan Leites (1951) over 50 years ago. Later, Alexander George (1969) made
great contributions to the operationalization of the concept, as did Ole Holsti (1970) and Stephen Walker (1977, 1983) with their empirical applications of the concept. Today, because of the contributions made by these, our predecessors, we continue to make advancements (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). We now have quantitative indicators derived from computer-driven content analysis procedures that allow us to make statistical comparisons of leaders and run regression models with our dependent variables to test the hypothesis that individuals’ belief systems have a causal effect on behavior. The process just described is an example of normal science at work, with the benefits visible therein.

Contributions to knowledge can come from many different sources and down alternative paths. At the same time, attempts to stifle intellectual growth can come from different sources and paths as well. Normal science can certainly stifle some intellectual paths, but so can those who vigorously oppose the processes of normal science. In the end, however, the objective is to add to knowledge regardless of source or path. Normal science can be both a hindrance and a benefit to such development. On the one hand, it can be a benefit by providing us with a basis for our research and focusing us on the cumulation of knowledge. On the other hand, it can be a hindrance by limiting our field of inquiry and disciplining our approaches. These arguments are certainly not novel. They are rehearsed here to build on the theme in the previous section: the theme of tolerance. If, indeed, our objective is to contribute to knowledge, then we need to be aware of how our practices help or hinder that process.

**Empirical Techniques That Can Enhance Research**

In this section, three specific empirical arenas are addressed that the author believes can enhance FPA in the coming years: computer-based textual assessment, state-level psychology, and experimental methods.

**Computers and Assessment-at-a-Distance**

Many people think of political psychology as relatively new to the IR field. Such is the case, in part, because the idea of rigorously assessing what leaders and leadership circles are like in a way that the data can be used meaningfully has proven to be a daunting task and much progress remains to be made. Perhaps the key breakthrough in this area was the development of “at-a-distance” methods. People like Margaret Hermann (1977, 1980a, 1980b, 1984), David Winter (1987, 1993; Winter and Stewart 1977), Philip Tetlock (1979, 1981, 1983), and Walter Weintraub (1986) posited the assumption that what leaders say and how they say it can indicate certain dimensions of their personalities. To assess a leader’s psychology, they argued, we need two things: (1) verbal material from the leader, and (2) constructs that operationalize language-based characteristics. The former is relatively easy to get for many subjects. As for the latter, these same scholars gave us theoretically grounded constructs that have been subject to various levels of validity testing. We now have content analysis procedures to assess operational code, worldviews, sensitivity to the political environment, motivational need (for power, affiliation, and achievement), level of distrust, ingroup bias, and leadership style among others.

Another impediment to this type of analysis has been the time needed for doing hand coding. Coding for each of these characteristics or sets of characteristics requires a well-trained coder pouring over texts, often one word at a time, making decisions based on rules. Any at-a-distance assessment done by human coders has demanded extensive time and energy. A handful of studies have been done using these methods, but this domain has been slow to develop in part because of this coding bottleneck. But this process is in the throes of change at present; over the
next twenty years the rate of change in this area will be dramatic. The keys have been the development of ways of doing machine coding of texts and the personal computer (see, for example, Young 2000, 2001).

The advantages of machine coding are fairly obvious. We will be able to code much more material in a shorter amount of time and to have more meaningful databases to use in making comparisons. As our Ns increase, we increase our capability to do quantitative as well as qualitative analysis. Another critical advantage of computer coding is its effect on reliability. Although validity of machine coding remains open for discussion, the fact is that once we have our operationalizations in the computer, reliability immediately goes up to 100 percent. No matter how the computer codes a passage the first time, it will code it exactly the same the second, third, and fourth times. Such is simply never the case with human coders. Computers do not suffer from the human frailties of fatigue, personal and political biases, different levels of training, or different interpretative skills and strategies.

It is true that humans can still do some things by hand that computers cannot. Moreover, human subjectivity will be hard to beat with a machine even with our technological advancements because in some cases humans make fewer mistakes than computers. Actually, however, probably the correct thing to say is that humans and computers make different kinds of mistakes. Sometimes a human coder can more effectively ascertain the meaning of a phrase than a computer can. But humans often miss things computers would never miss. For example, take the simple word counts used in determining leaders' conceptual complexity. Once the dictionaries are complete, the computer misses none of the words in the dictionary; whereas with hand-coding, we frequently have trouble getting coders up to an 85 percent accuracy rate on this construct.

This issue is not simply about the tradeoff between validity (human coding) and reliability (computer coding), in part because in the areas for which the computer is more accurate, it (and not human coding) is also more valid. (Remember that, as discussed above, the reverse is never the case: human coding is never more reliable than computers.) But, let us say for argument's sake that human coding is more valid. Would that make it more valuable? It appears to this author better to have lots of material coded exactly the same way—no coder biases or fatigue effects—than much smaller amounts of material that have such coder biases. In the end, the computer will make the same kinds of errors across our samples, meaning that its effect will not bias the results. The same cannot be said when material is coded by a number of humans and human errors are entered into the data.

The discussion above refers to the validity of individual coding decisions, but we also need to talk about the validity of our indicators. The scholars who first gave us these at-a-distance indicators did so based on their best reading and thinking about political leaders and how their personalities can affect what governments do. Put somewhat differently, they have given us indicators that seem to pass a “face validity” test. The indicators they have come up with are clever, interesting, and appear to reflect the characteristics they were intended to assess. But this statement is not the end of the story. We need more rigorous validity checks—probably “construct validity” tests. These types of evaluations have been few and far between in part because of the coding bottleneck. If it takes six months of intense coding to assess one leader, then, given the publish-or-perish nature of our profession, the results better be substantive and interesting, that is, publishable. The types of rigorous validity tests discussed here are strictly methodological questions—things that generally are not substantive enough to make it into the top journals. However, now that we are developing machine coding technologies, we will be able to process much more material at much faster rates, thus giving us more time to conduct thorough validity tests. In the process, we are likely to find some of the old
indicators are not as valid as we hoped; we will need to rework the operationalizations or come up with new variables. But, regardless, computer technology can take us a long way in the direction of making the study of leaders and leadership circles a more rigorous science.

State-Level Psychology

As computer coding develops and our confidence in assessing leaders’ characteristics increases, richer and more complex models of the effects of such variables on the policymaking process need to be developed as well. This task is now feasible in at least two areas. The first is the interaction between leaders and advisors. Do leaders pick advisors who are like them? Do better leaders pick advisors who complement or contrast with their own personalities and leadership styles? Do advisors whose characteristics match those of the leader closely have their advice listened to more often than those who are different from the leader? Are there additive effects among psychological traits among leaders and advisors? For example, if the advisors are more hawkish than the leader, does that significantly affect the leader’s choice propensity? If so, how much? Thomas Preston (1997, 2001) examines precisely these types of questions for recent US administrations. Similarly, Walker and his colleagues (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998, 1999) in working on the operational code have talked about the operational codes of states, rather than restricting this concept to individuals. Is it correct to think about group-level (average) psychological characteristics? Can we assess beliefs of an aggregate, such as a particular decision-making group in a government?

A second state-level area in which computer coding of psychological characteristics could prove useful is in exploring such societal variables as national mood, national role conceptions, ideology, and strategic culture, as well as the accessibility of particular norms. Using output from the media, Internet, web, party platforms, ads, and pamphlets, for instance, we could begin to assess not only what the public is being urged to believe but also the effect that such information appears to be having on the public. Is public opinion following or leading in the shaping of foreign policy? Or, perhaps the better question to ask is under what conditions does the public lead and when does it follow? What is the congruence between what the people are being told and their opinions as recorded in surveys? How do various groups, organizations, institutions, lobbying groups, and so on frame issues of importance to them in trying to influence policymakers? As an example of research in this genre, consider Andrea Grove’s (2001) exploration of the rhetoric of Jerry Adams and John Hume and the groups they represented as they competed for the vote among Catholics in Northern Ireland across a series of elections.

More Experiments

Another method that foreign policy analysts might want to add to their tool kit is the experiment. Some scholars (for example, Geva, DeRouen, and Minz 1993; Mintz and Geva 1993; Beer, Healy, and Bourne 2003) engaged in FPA have found the experiment to be a highly useful tool; others have argued that ways to employ the comparative case study approach to simulate an experiment are available (for example, Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). Experiments are one of the best methods for isolating causal effects. If we take two groups, either shown or known to be equivalent, introduce an intervention to one group while administering a placebo to the second, and see a difference across the two groups afterwards, we can attribute it fairly unequivocally to one thing: the intervention. No matter how good the data are from other methods, it is more difficult to isolate causation the way we can with experiments.
But many skeptics think that the artificialness of an experiment makes the findings suspect. Unfortunately, the burden of proof regarding external validity virtually always falls on the experimenter: “How do you know that this phenomenon will happen in a natural setting?” “How can you make the assumption that students are like policymakers?” More to the point, however, whether or not we need to prove external validity, experiments remain a powerful tool and one that foreign policy analysts should consider as a regular part of their methodological tool kit. Of course, experiments should not be the only method used. We need to pursue methodological pluralism, getting answers to our questions by using multiple methods and triangulating our results and insights.

Conclusion

In this brief essay, we have considered the counterproductiveness of naysaying and the normal-science practices of restraining areas of inquiry while at the same time arguing for the value of cumulative empirical research. As the world grows smaller and closer and as our technological capabilities continue to improve, we have the opportunity to more rigorously investigate the classic debates of realism versus idealism, rationality versus psychology, and system versus state and individual levels of analysis. We are in the business of looking for answers. The more open we are to alternative approaches, methods, ideas, and sources of evidence, the more cumulative our knowledge will become, and the more we will learn about foreign policymaking.

Foreign Policymaking and Group Dynamics: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going

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Research on foreign policymaking has focused on the policy process and the organizational context around policy decisions to explain foreign policy behavior. This research tradition includes multiple theories and a wide variety of methodologies; it demonstrates complex relationships among foreign policy factors, and it links its scholarly research to practical policy concerns (see, for example, Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995; Hudson 2002). This essay focuses on one piece of this diverse picture—the study of decision groups—as a means of bridging the individual and organizational levels of analysis. In complex foreign policy cases involving uncertainty, political controversy, and conflicting values, members of decision groups (like the US president’s inner circle) become central to the judgment process by defining the nature of the problem and presenting appropriate options for discussion. The more than thirty years of scholarship examining group dynamics provide us with a strong basis on which to determine when understanding what is happening in decision groups is critical to the study of foreign policy. An important claim in this literature is that group decision making (broadly defined) is relevant to understanding what presidents, prime ministers, and other foreign policy actors do in the foreign policy arena—even as the definition of what constitutes foreign policy and how foreign policy actors interact is expanded.

This essay will assess past research on group decision making in order to set the stage for a discussion of the paths that future research might take. Two classics, Graham Allison’s (1971) Essence of Decision and Irving Janis’ (1972) Victims of
Groupthink, serve as the starting point. An overview of the contributions of these pieces will be followed by critiques that provide a baseline to propose alternative avenues for the study of group decision making in the next two decades. In the process, we will consider the important question of how individual cognitions become aggregated to form group decisions.

How Much Have We Moved beyond Groupthink and Bureaucratic Politics?

Janis’ (1972) volume became a pioneering work in the study of foreign policymaking by questioning the prevailing wisdom about the nature of group dynamics in the foreign-policy context. In explaining policy fiascoes such as John F. Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs decision, Janis concluded that group decisions can limit options and lead to suboptimal policy choices. In his case studies, policymakers failed to achieve their goals because groupthink symptoms pressured members of the group into consensus-seeking behavior to the point that tolerance for dissenting viewpoints was reduced. The resulting conformity hindered the group’s ability to make sound judgments (Janis 1972, 1982, 1989; see also Vertzberger 1990; ’t Hart 1994).

The “pulling and hauling” illustrated in Allison’s (1971) bureaucratic politics model (Model III) represents another possible interaction pattern in a group setting. In this scenario, individuals with diverse parochial goals, beliefs, and motives compete for influence as they work to overcome their opposition. When officials with influence differ on how they want problems resolved, bargaining results. Although compromise decisions are the assumed outcome, they do not always occur. In fact, Yaacov Vertzberger (1990) argues that extreme competition with high levels of conflict can lead to naysaying or stalemates in which it is impossible to reach any sort of decision. Although Janis and Allison offer different explanations for what happens in the decision context, they share an emphasis on multiple actors contributing to the decision process and a range of potential policy processes and outcomes.

For their efforts, these authors have faced a similar kind of question from the international relations community regarding the contribution their research (and others like it) have made to the field. From a philosophy of science perspective, critics argue that the assumptions of these models are ambiguous and arbitrary, that the propositions based on these assumptions are not rigorously derived, and that the relations among the variables are left obscure. Specifically, Allison’s bureaucratic politics model has been described as “an analytical kitchen sink” (Bendor and Hammond 1992:314–319; Welch 1992). More recently, David Welch (1998) has argued that the bureaucratic politics model is guilty of inadequate conceptual development, underspecified variables, and unprovable methodological and empirical claims.

Groupthink shares some of these same problems. For one, it has been difficult to directly observe concurrence-seeking behavior in the foreign-policy context, thus creating problems with empirical validation of the groupthink phenomenon. Critics argue that groupthink hypotheses have not been tested rigorously and accuse Janis of imposing his explanation on many of his cases (Longley and Pruitt 1980; George 1997). To Sally Fuller and Raymond Aldag (1997:92), “groupthink per se is a phenomenon lacking empirical support and resting on generally unsupported assumptions. Indeed, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the groupthink model is its continuing appeal in the face of non-confirming evidence.” In light of these criticisms, the prevailing wisdom today recognizes that groupthink is a contingent property of foreign policymaking and just one of many possible dynamics among members of a group engaged in making a decision (see, for example, ’t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997; Hermann et al. 2001).
Both Allison and Janis do fail to provide a completely coherent or fully specified model (or paradigm) on a scale that would please most positivists. To their critics, both theorists fail to make the hard choices about what variables each theory should include or exclude. Given that Allison along with Philip Zelikow reworked all three models in rewriting *Essence of Decision* in 1999, we might have assumed that they would address their critics. In the case of the bureaucratic politics model (Model III), however, they merely added related areas of research (for example, a discussion of two-level games, principal-agent issues, and agenda-setting and framing) giving the model the appearance of representing a grab bag of concepts.

Additionally, the second edition of *Essence of Decision* fails to draw on the growing literature within social and political psychology on intragroup interactions (see Kaarbo and Gruenfeld 1998; ’t Hart and Preston 1999). For example, from the research on political psychology, we know that leaders are motivated by complex factors, that their leadership styles affect advisory dynamics, and that they interact with one another in fairly predictable ways (see Preston 2001). Because Allison and Zelikow fail to incorporate this literature, they miss an opportunity to specify their variables more fully and to strengthen Model III especially.

These criticisms, however, do not minimize the impact that the ideas regarding bureaucratic politics and groupthink still have on foreign policymaking or the possibilities for using them in future middle-range theorizing (see Kaarbo’s essay in this symposium). These models helped scholars move away from the assumption of the state as a unitary rational actor and opened the black box of the government to show how the dynamic character of the decision process can shape foreign policy behavior. Even though it remains important to acknowledge that some criticisms of these models do, indeed, pose challenges, rather than undermining the approach they provide guidance regarding future debates in the study of foreign policy.

### Reviewing Persistent Challenges as a Guide to Future Directions

A persistent challenge for this literature remains understanding how different individual influences interact within and across levels of analysis and how the resulting patterns of behavior influence policy choice. Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius (1997) have proposed that we consider classifying group interaction patterns to include a range, running from conformity (that is, groupthink) to conflict (that is, bureaucratic politics), and the hybrids between these two extremes. This effort to classify behavior within the group provides the means to bridge one of the oldest conflicts between Allison and some of his critics, especially Stephen Krasner (1972), who claim that decision making is more than a bargaining process between competing role interests because the president selects individuals who share his values. Similarly, Robert Art’s (1973) argument that shared mind-sets influence decision makers and their orientations (and thus mitigate Allison’s bureaucratic competition) is reminiscent of some of the points made by Irving Janis. Because both consensus and dissensus are potential properties of the group process, room exists for considering complex motivations, shared mind-sets, bureaucratic conflict, and even norms that encourage dissenting points of view (George and Stern 2002).

Thus, an integrated group dynamics perspective, culled from various approaches, would assume that decisions result from a collaborative process in which individual preferences are aggregated by one means or another. Studies that focus on individual cognition, perception and misperception, images, operational codes, beliefs systems, and attitudes provide us with some basis on which to understand how individual preferences can become aggregated as members of a group interact in the decision-making process. Although these bodies of knowledge complement the literature on group dynamics, they do not necessarily focus on it specifically. Brian Ripley (1995), for one, argues that studies such as those on
bureaucratic politics illustrate how members of interdependent, competitive, and hierarchical decision groups reason about the policy process and what impact this reasoning has on foreign policy outputs. Eric Stern and Bertjan Verbeek (1998:244) insist that the bureaucratic politics literature provides us “with an array of conceptual tools and techniques” that are useful and often indispensable in interpreting policymaking (see also Rosenthal, ’t Hart, and Kouzmin 1991).

The challenge comes as we move beyond the narrow focus on the National Security Council, the Tuesday Lunch Group, or the ExComm (in the US context). Allison and Zelikow (1999) acknowledge that other ad hoc actors outside the US president’s inner circle play a role in policymaking. Roger Hilsman’s (1987) analysis of concentric circles of influence around the president demonstrates the wider potential inputs to decision processes and the need for flexibility when identifying influential players. Such actors can include governmental actors such as members of Congress but also in some instances lobbyists, the media, and the public.

To handle the broadened definition of group decision making that this discussion suggests, we need to consider under what conditions the scope of the decision unit widens (or narrows). For one thing, we know that a leader’s style and needs can shape the organization of an advisory system. Studies of the structure of advisory systems by Richard Tanner Johnson (1974) and Alexander George (1980), for example, have reported that different types of advisory structures (collegial, competitive, and formalistic) set the parameters for decisions. More recent research exploring whether the nature of the advisory system can influence who will become involved in making the decision (for example, Hoyt 1997; Preston 1997, 2001; Garrison 1999) lends support to these older studies.

Analyzing the type of situation is another way of determining who is likely to participate in the decision-making group (see Rosati 1981). With issues that have a high level of presidential interest or during foreign policy crises, the decision-making circle closes. In these situations, the characteristics of the leader and major advisors become particularly important (Gaenslen 1992). Routine issues of little importance to the leader are handled further down in the bureaucracy and may follow a pattern of bureaucratic politics. By implication, when decisions are made in less hierarchical groups, or when an executive relies heavily on outside experts or needs to build a broader governing coalition, membership in the decision group widens and varies in terms of who is included. More explicitly, several scholars (Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan 1987; Hermann and Hagan 1998; Hagan and Hermann 2001; Hermann 2001a) have distinguished among different types of decision units found in the foreign policymaking literature—the predominant leader, single group, and coalition—and indicated the situations and types of political structures in which each is likely to be present, as well as how the nature of the decision unit can influence the foreign policy that results.

Stern and Sundelius (1997) bring together many of the themes just discussed. They develop a five-step process to analyze critical contextual and group structural variables that channel group interaction patterns. These steps include investigating (1) the extra-group setting, (2) the intragroup setting (including group composition and structural variables), (3) the leadership practices of the group, (4) the level of cohesion in the group, and (5) the type and level of conflict in the group. Their analysis points to the need to take both the external context and the internal situation into account. Given the increasing importance of intermestic issues and the reality of the penetrated state, the flexibility that comes with a broader orientation becomes critical if we are to explain the input of new players and new foreign policy scenarios. (See Foyle’s essay in this symposium.)

By implication, studies of group decision making can and must be applied more generally to non-US and nonpresidential systems. This criticism has persisted because our most discussed examples remain Allison’s discussion of the Cuban missile crisis, Morton Halperin’s analysis of bureaucratic politics in the Johnson
administration (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 1974), and Janis’ focus on US foreign policy fiascoes. However, despite the disproportionate focus on US cases, the approaches we have been describing are not limited in scope to the United States. Indeed, power has been viewed as fluid and group interactions have been found to shift across and even within administrations. Within the US context and others, central players have different levels of status and authority in the group and greater or lesser opportunity to define problems favorably. Research on manipulation within the group—including strategies of exclusion and inclusion, agenda-setting, and issue framing—has shown how individuals other than the chief executive can determine who gets to make a decision, the nature of the group interaction process that will occur, and the particular decision that is likely to result (see Hoyt 1997; Hoyt and Garrison 1997; Garrison 1999, 2001).

The critical issue in this instance is not nationality, but the degree of power-sharing in the policymaking group. Thirty years ago, Allison applied his model to a presidential system in which power was arranged more vertically than in other political systems. Recent research has illustrated how multiple actors can have individual bases of power and, as a result, how influence over outcomes becomes shared (see Maoz 1990b; Garrison 1999). For example, advisors like Henry Kissinger can bolster their positions when they manipulate the decision process and access to outside sources of information, thus, serving a gate-keeping function. Others can have considerable influence by using their expertise to add to their authority.

The future group decision-making agenda must focus on political situations outside the US context, especially in places where power is organized more horizontally (that is, within cabinet systems and oligarchies). Conceptualizing group decision making more broadly, Juliet Kaarbo’s (1998) work on minority influence in parliamentary systems is an example of the kind of cross-national study that is needed. Similarly, Paul ’t Hart’s (1994) analysis of groupthink as it applies to Dutch decision-making situations is a case in point. These individuals represent part of a cohort actively working to broaden the scope of the study of group decision making by taking a comparative perspective.

Quality of Foreign Policy Judgments

A core impetus for the study of foreign policymaking has been the desire to increase the quality of decision making by discovering an optimal organizational structure. From Allison to Janis to the present, scholars have worked to explain foreign policy phenomena with an eye to improving the process and the resulting policy choices. Janis’ research clearly has a normative quality in that one of his reasons for studying groupthink was to illustrate the dangers of stereotyping in foreign policy because such processes tend to lead to high-risk behavior. The general problem-solving approach in his work, and that of others, is to provide policymakers with an analysis concerning how to fix defects within the system.

A paradox emerges from these procedural efforts. When groupthink-like problems surface, Janis and others emphasize that the goal needs to be effective information processing through a more open and methodical presentation of options. Janis (1989), for instance, argues that vigilant decision making can be approximated in a series of steps that can guarantee the full presentation of policy options. Leaders who actively encourage others to participate, as John F. Kennedy did during the Cuban Missile Crisis, create a more vigilant decision-making process. Similarly, George’s (1980) multiple advocacy proposal and the appointment of a devil’s advocate to push for unpopular options are two techniques to make sure that the discussion on policy alternatives stays open to facilitate a full assessment of options (George 1980; Hermann 1993; George and Stern 2002). Moreover, other social psychologists, like Janis, have suggested that fostering
teamwork and groups with open participation and leadership will encourage cohesion and, in turn, create a positive decision-making environment (see Hackman 1987; Varney 1991).

Prescriptions concerning the conditions that lead to a dysfunctional group process as well as the fixes that are proposed, however, often arise from where the scholars themselves sit. The prescriptions generally vary depending on whether these scholars value the need for teamwork or the need for more diversity of opinions in the group process. Although such prescriptions supposedly offer the hope of error-free decision making, it is possible to overapply procedural fixes to policymaking pathologies. Pursuing a procedural fix such as appointing a devil’s advocate to avoid extreme conformity may lead to a situation of conflict and bureaucratic politics over time. The political context within which decisions are made complicates the process even more. The time it would take to implement one of the fixes may not be available in a particular situation if time is of the essence. Additionally, the policy group may not be nearly as malleable as analysts believe; indeed, they may resist changing the nature of their group for the better. Research (Garrison, Hoyt, and Wituski 1997) indicates that these situational fixes are less likely to work if they are imported into the policymaking setting without regard to time constraints and resource issues.

As this discussion suggests, no single organizational prescription is likely to fix all systems all the time. Instead, we need to adjust our expectations about what is possible and desirable to the specific policymaking context.

**Conclusions**

By evaluating the past along with the areas in need of change in the future, it becomes possible to identify predictable patterns in group dynamics and to show how they can influence policy choices. Three factors emerged as important in our review: (1) the ways in which members of a group interact, (2) the level of openness (that is, access and hierarchy) in the group, and (3) the role that the central leader in the group plays. For example, decisions made in a closed system, with a consensual interaction dynamic, and a strong central leader involve the consideration of fewer options and result in certain individuals taking a dominant, if not predominant, role in the proceedings. Decisions that occur in an open system, in which diverse views are presented and the central leader is weak, often include discussion of a range of possible options, result in compromise, or may even lead to deadlock when extensive disagreement among members exists. In both these scenarios, if we understand who is involved in the policymaking process and the rules or procedures governing how decisions are made in that group, it becomes possible to understand and even forecast policy choices. (For an example of an attempt to make such predictions, see Beasley et al. 2001.)

The study of group decision making is still in its infancy; currently no coherent model or paradigm exists. But having such a paradigm is not the point. The future of the study of groups in foreign policy decision making rests on the assumption that complexity is valuable. A major reason for research on groups is to provide more accurate explanations of the decision process and the effects that the process can have on policy outcomes. After all, what are the various ways that policymakers use to resolve their disagreements when they do not have a shared view about what should happen, and how do the procedures they adopt under such conditions shape their choices, implementation of any decision, and further reflection on the problem?

Future group decision-making analyses will benefit by continuing to promote research programs that are open to diverse perspectives and methods. An examination of past studies suggests that more exploration is needed on such aspects of group decision making as advisory processes, issue framing and agenda setting, and the exercise of leadership. These various strands are not necessarily
linked nor do they constitute a complete view of this process. What they do share is a basic insight: to understand foreign policymaking demands knowledge about what is happening among the members of the group or groups involved in defining the problem, making choices, overseeing implementation of the decision, and evaluating the outcome.

Multidisciplinary, cross-national studies will extend the reach of research in this area. One of the greatest challenges for the study of group decision making in the foreign policy arena over the next two decades is to expand its base of knowledge beyond the traditional focus on “high” politics in the US context. In the process, the study of group decision making in foreign policy may lose its distinctiveness from other problem-solving settings, such as occur in the making of public policy or comparative public policy. This potential loss of distinctiveness pales in comparison to the new doors that might open if we can demonstrate the applicability of what we have learned about the importance of groups in foreign policymaking to other areas of inquiry both inside and outside the field of international relations.

Crisis Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis: Insights, Synergies, and Challenges

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For good and ill, the development of foreign policy analysis has been and will continue to be intimately linked to the phenomenon of crisis in both domestic and international politics. The problem of coping with crisis exerts a strong gravitational pull on scholars and practitioners alike for good political and psychological reasons. Crises are consequential, dramatic, vivid, and emotionally charged. They are moments or periods of truth in which the mettle of leaders and the robustness of institutions are tested and frailties are quickly revealed to colleagues, journalists, and citizens. Crises tend to capture the attention of leaders and scholars alike, sometimes to the neglect of other fundamental but less thrilling aspects of national and international politics. Events such as the Korean Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Energy Crises of the mid-1970s, Chernobyl, the Gulf War, Mad Cow Disease, and September 11, 2001, demand our attention and cast long political and intellectual shadows (Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001).

Crisis studies provide opportunities for leadership that are not only exploited by policy practitioners but by scholars as well. In the personal computer industry, it has become commonplace for strategists to use the term “the killer application” to refer to a software product that becomes a vehicle for launching a new technological platform. Major crises have often served as such killer applications in the scholarly community, providing compelling empirical demonstrations of theoretical or metatheoretical arguments. Glen Paige’s (1968) study of the Korean Crisis became an important exemplar, showing how Richard Snyder and his associates’ (1962) foreign policy decision-making framework could be used as a basis for theoretically driven empirical research. Other good examples include Yuen Foong Khong’s (1992) use of the Vietnam crisis of 1965 to launch his theoretical framework for the analysis of the impact of historical analogy on foreign policymaking, and Barbara Farnham’s (1997) employment of the Munich Crisis as a means of showcasing her political decision-making approach.

Graham Allison’s (1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999) The Essence of Decision, which was examined by Jean Garrison in her essay in this symposium, cleverly used the
Cuban Missile Crisis—one of the great political thrillers of the twentieth century—as a launching pad to make a number of metatheoretical, theoretical, and practical contributions to the literature. The phenomenal success of this work testifies to the potency of crises as killer empirical applications. Inspired by Allison’s enduring tripartite (metatheoretical, theoretical-conceptual, and practical) contribution to the foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature, this essay will attempt to outline some past and potential contributions that the interdisciplinary discourse on crisis can make to the FPA agenda.

**Metatheory, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Crisis Studies**

A recurring theme in crisis studies, FPA, and international relations has been the issue of ontology. Underpinning any choice of research question or puzzle, any choice of research design or method, are assumptions regarding what exists in the social world and how these entities are related to one another. For example, Snyder and his colleagues (1962, 1969) rejected the statist ontology set out in Hans Morgenthau’s (1948) *Politics Among Nations* when they formulated their own programmatic manifesto *Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Whereas Morgenthau saw a world of power-seeking states (see Vasquez 1998), Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin saw a world of decision makers ensconced in groups, organizations, and national cultures subjectively interpreting situations (see Vertzberger 1990; Ripley 1993; Hudson 1995; Welch 1998; Carlsnaes 2002). J. David Singer’s (1969) early article on the level of analysis problem and Peter Gourevitch’s (1978) later one stand out as other important and relatively early attempts to clarify the ontological issues at stake in foreign policy analysis and international relations.

Over the course of the past few decades, a variety of ontological metaphors have been posited to capture the nature of actors and their interactions in international affairs. We have seen the billiard balls and magnetic poles of realism, the octopus of structuralism, the cobwebs of transnationalism and interdependence, and more recently the metaphor of textuality (Waever 1996). The debates of the 1990s once again brought ontological issues to the forefront in a decade that began with Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s (1990) *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* and ended with Alexander Wendt’s (1999) provocative *Social Theory of International Politics*.

Looking forward, it is likely that the trend toward a heightened ontological consciousness in the field will continue. Reifications of the state and other central units of analysis should become problematized to a far greater extent than during the heyday of structural realism, as many crisis studies have vividly demonstrated (for example, Allison 1971; Lebow 1981; Brecher 1993; Richardson 1994; Farnham 1997; Haney 1997; Preston 2001). Top-down approaches to international relations must be complemented by bottom-up approaches (see Maoz 1990a) that take into account the multiple roles and nested contexts (Granovetter 1992) that enable, constrain, and constitute the players and playing fields of foreign policymaking (Goertz 1994; ’t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997; Hagan and Hermann 2001).

Another metatheoretical issue likely to heat up in the short to medium term centers on the pros and cons of multiperspectivism. As noted above, Allison’s seminal *Essence of Decision* has been an influential work, not only in FPA, international relations, and political science, but in the social sciences as a whole. The monograph’s enormous impact derived in part from its relatively early (nine years after the fact) empirical contribution to the rapidly growing literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, another factor critical to the book’s enduring appeal was its provocative metatheoretical statement. Inspired in part by Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) work on the role of paradigms in scientific revolutions, Allison convincingly demonstrated that both research questions and results tend to change dramatically
as one shifts from one set of ontological and theoretical assumptions to another. Though heavily criticized on empirical and theoretical grounds (see, for example, Krasner 1972; Bendor and Hammond 1992; Welch 1992), Allison’s study has proved influential as a result of its research design, with many scholars subsequently attempting to pit alternative models or paradigms against each other and emphasizing the juxtaposition of alternative perspectives in more or less competitive tests (for example, Steinbruner 1974; Vandenbroucke 1984; Snyder 1991; Parker and Stern 2002).

Although Allison’s work, the second edition of which was published a few years ago (Allison and Zelikow 1999), remains one of the most widely cited exemplars of multiperspectivism, a number of others (some of which come from adjacent fields) are worthy of note. For example, Gareth Morgan (1986) takes no less than eight metaphors as alternative approaches to illuminating the phenomenon of organization in social life. Public administration theorists Marc Bovens and Paul ’t Hart identify four alternative conceptualizations of public policymaking—as problem-solving, competing values, institutional interaction, and structurally constrained—in their 1996 study Understanding Policy Fiascoes. They argue that serious commensurability problems are likely to plague attempts to competitively test paradigms or models against each other, suggesting that the juxtaposition of the results of multiple models against each other may be the best that one can do in many instances. In another pathbreaking study, The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Marieke Kleiboer (1998) derives and applies alternative models of international conflict with very different implications for explaining and evaluating attempts at third party intervention to several historical cases.

Multiperspectivism represents an impulse to separate, elucidate, juxtapose, and compare analytical frameworks derived from alternative ontological or theoretical assumptions. A complementary impulse is the attempt to synthesize and integrate bodies of knowledge, theories, or explanations that have previously been seen as distinct. For example, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin’s (1962) framework of analysis should be seen as a partial attempt to integrate knowledge from several disciplines and levels of analysis into a single analytical strategy (Hudson 2002:4–6). One might argue that Michael Brecher and his colleagues’ (1969) input-process-output model of FPA should be seen as another relatively early attempt at integration, and one that has had an important impact on the crisis studies field in the form of the innovative International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project (Brecher 1993; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). Among others who have worked in this mode are Walter Carlsnaes (1986, 1992), Yaacov Vertzberger (1990), James Rosenau (1992), the Decision Units Project (Hermann and Hermann 1989; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann 1989; Hermann and Hagan 1998; Hagan and Hermann 2001), and the rapidly growing group of scholars exploring the so-called poliheuristic approach to the study of decision making (for example, Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz 2002; Redd 2002).

Work on cognitive-institutional process tracing in the Crisis Management Europe research program (Stern 1999; Stern and Sundelius 2002; Stern et al. 2002) should also be seen as belonging to this tradition. This approach takes as its point of departure the common emphasis on dynamic subjectivity and processes of problem framing-representation (see Sylvan and Voss 1998; Garrison 2001) that characterizes both the psychological literature on social cognition and naturalistic decision making (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Klein 2001) and several strands of the so-called new institutionalism in sociology and political science (March and Olsen 1989; Peters 1999). Essentially, this view suggests that problem setting and problem solving by individuals, groups, and organizations is heavily influenced by path dependent experiential and contextual factors that can best be uncovered through process tracing and comparison.

Thus, a strong candidate for one of the next Great Debates in IR, FPA, and crisis studies is a friendly battle between multiperspectivists and integrators—a research
design discussion à la Gary King and his associates (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) and Charles Ragin (1994) that could have profound implications for the conduct and interpretation of future empirical research.

Crisis Studies: Conceptual Innovations and Extensions

The chronic use and abuse of the term “crisis” in popular and scientific discourse suggests that a rigorous specification is necessary if the notion is to generate anything other than confusion. Like its sister concept “security” (see Buzan 1991; Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998; Eriksson 2001), crisis demands an explicit referent if the concept is to have meaning. An individual, a group, a network, an organization, a society, or a state each can experience a crisis situation. Alternatively, crisis situations can simultaneously threaten actors bound up in bi- or multilateral relationships in a regional subsystem or the international system at large.

Charles Hermann (1972, 1989) distinguishes three broad approaches to the study of crisis within the field of international relations, each focusing on a different level of analysis: the systemic, actor confrontation, and decision-making approaches. In systemic crisis studies the focus is on the stability of the international order (for example, McClelland 1972; Carr 2001). Actor-confrontation studies examine two or more actors engaged in conflictual communication and crisis bargaining (for example, Williams 1976; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Lebow 1981; George 1991; Richardson 1994). Research on decision making during crisis focuses on the predicament of those acting in the name of the state (or some other comparable entity) in a critical situation (see below). To this tripartite division should be added an emerging fourth and to some extent cross-cutting tradition—the political symbolic approach—which focuses attention on the manipulation of symbols, rituals, and power in crisis communication (for example, Edelman 1988; ’t Hart 1993; Bryder 1998; Weldes 1999).

Because space considerations preclude us examining all these approaches to the study of crisis, we will focus here on the decision-making mode. The referents of such crises are the policymakers who take responsibility for coping with a given problem. As Hermann (1989:360) has proposed, this mode:

examine[s] the task of reaching and implementing choice within a single government or other policymaking unit. The members of a government perceive, not always correctly, the emergence of an acute situation that can cause them, or their policy, harm. The individual and organizational means of coping with the crisis problem become the object of study.

Hermann’s (1963, 1972:13) own definition of what constitutes a decision-making crisis stands out as a seminal contribution to the development of this tradition: Specifically, a crisis is a situation that (1) threatens the high priority goals of the decision unit, (2) restricts the amount of time available before the decision is transformed, and (3) surprises the members of the decision unit by its occurrence.

Hermann’s conceptualization derives from the subjective perceptions of the policymakers who are involved in recognizing and dealing with the problem. The analyst’s task is to “interpret the situation as it is perceived by the decision makers” (Hermann 1972:13). Ole Holstø (1972:9) replaced the focus on goals in this definition with that of “important values.” The ICB Project researchers (Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Moser 1988:3) subsequently narrowed and refined this definition of foreign policy crisis further:

Viewed from the perspective of a state, a crisis is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions, deriving from a change in its external or internal environment. All three are perceptions held by the highest level decision makers: (1) a threat to basic values, with a simultaneous or subsequent awareness of (2) a
finite time for response, and of the (3) high probability of involvement in military hostilities.
[emphasis in original]

These authors identify two kinds of basic values: core values and high priority values. Core values are closely associated with the state itself, irrespective of the particular government in power—such as “survival of a state and its population, the avoidance of grave damage through war” (Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Moser 1988:3). High priority values “derive from ideological or material interests as defined by decision makers at the time of a specific crisis” (Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Moser 1988:3). The latter also encompasses decision makers’ concerns for their reputations and their ability to remain in power. Thus, political considerations are seen as a potential object of threat and a source of stress for policymakers.

The ICB definition discarded Hermann’s surprise criterion on the grounds that it was difficult to operationalize, noting that Hermann himself subsequently distanced himself from this aspect of the definition (see Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Moser 1988:2). Yet, to the extent that a particular crisis problem is not anticipated, appropriate planning is likely to be lacking, and more improvisation will be required in making crisis decisions. Non-anticipation—ceteris paribus—is likely to be associated with heightened individual and institutional stress (see Holsti 1972).

Furthermore, the growing literature on strategic surprise suggests that surprise or non-anticipation is, in fact, empirically tractable—at least in intensive (small N) qualitative studies (Vertzberger 1990; Parker and Stern 2002).

Like those involved in the ICB Project, Rosenthal and his colleagues (Rosenthal, ’t Hart, and Charles 1989:9–10) emphasized threat to fundamental values (as well as norms) and time pressure in their considerations of what can be considered a crisis while at the same time de-emphasizing surprise. However, unlike the ICB scholars, they proposed making uncertainty one of the definitional criteria for distinguishing crisis situations, arguing that surprise is only one of many factors that can increase the level of stress-inducing uncertainties in crisis situations. As a result, Rosenthal, ’t Hart, and Charles (1989:10) submit the following definition of crisis: “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a social system which—under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances—necessitates making critical decisions.”

Hermann’s definition, even though created with the state and possibly international organizations in mind, is clearly applicable to other types of organizations as well—such as provincial, state (as in a federal system), or city governments. A number of other scholars have asserted that corporations and nongovernmental organizations can legitimately be conceived as potentially crisis prone (for example, Slatter 1984; Mitroff and Kilmann 1984; Mitroff, Pearson, and Mitroff 1993). Even the ICB conceptualization (points 1 and 2) appears potentially adaptable if one redefines basic values in a manner appropriate to other types of referents. Moreover, regarding the nature of the threat to basic values, nothing in the Hermann definition inherently restricts crises to the military security issue area or to threats from other states.

Clearly, a synthetic definition is in order. Maintaining the generality of the Hermann definition while incorporating some of the conceptual refinements added by others suggests the following:

A decision-making crisis is a situation, deriving from a change in the external or internal environment of a collectivity, characterized by three necessary and sufficient perceptions on the part of the responsible decision makers: 1. A threat to basic values; 2. Urgency; 3. Uncertainty. (Stern and Sundelius 2002:72)

This general definition can be further modified to more closely specify the parameters required for the emergence of crisis within a given issue area.
In FPA, studies of decision-making crises have focused heavily on military-security issues. The term “military-security crisis” embraces those situations that threaten basic values through perceptions of a heightened risk of military violence (see, for example, Allison 1971; Hermann 1972; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Lebow 1981; Oneal 1982; Brecher 1993; George 1991; Richardson 1994; Haney 1997; Hess 2001; Bynander 2003).

Other scholars have argued that economic crises also involve short term and rapidly emerging threats to material and political values (for example, Brecher 1977; Maruyama 1990; Angel 1991; Stern and Sundelius 1997). Such crises might include situations such as resource shortages, dramatic price hikes (for buyers), or price collapses (for sellers) in a situation of extreme economic dependence upon the resource or product in question. The currency crises that repeatedly beset European, Asian, and Latin American countries during the 1990s are good examples of economic crises that could meet the definition set out above, as are the oil shocks of the 1970s. An interesting hybrid crisis situation emerges when the imposition of economic sanctions against an aggressor creates an economic crisis for that country or its trading partners. The US trade sanctions and oil embargo against Japan in the lead-up to US involvement in World War II ultimately triggered an economic-military crisis and played a major role in provoking the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Baldwin 1985; Craig and George 1995). The cases of Serbia and Iraq in the 1990s are good illustrations of this type of hybrid.

Although the term is frequently used in domestic and international environmental discourse, environmental crises have rarely been conceptualized as decision-making crises. Environmental problems looming on the horizon (such as climate change and ozone depletion) are often described as crises, when in fact they do not appear to exhibit the acute and immediate character of what we are calling decision-making crises. From this perspective, these problems represent potential environmental crises (or longer-term environmental security issues) as opposed to decision-making crises (see Deudney and Matthew 1999; Barnett 2001).

A distinguishing feature of environmental decision-making crises, then, often involves perceptions of acute threat to biological values. Threats to biological values include immediate threats to human health (such as highly contagious diseases like AIDS, SARS, and Ebola), threats to essential resources that support life in human ecosystems (for example, air, water supply, and food production), threats to the human habitat, threats to the integrity of valued nonhuman ecosystems such as rapidly diminishing biodiversity (see Barnett 2001).

As in other kinds of crises, the perception of urgency is key in environmental decision-making crises. One potential source of time pressure derives from the “window of opportunity” phenomenon. In many types of situations exhibiting mounting threat to biological values, a timely and effective intervention may serve to avert or mitigate the consequences of the threat factor. Consider, for example, in a potential epidemic; timely diagnosis of the situation and decisive action— isola- tion of carriers, widespread distribution of an appropriate vaccine, and so on— promise to minimize the negative effects of the episode. However, if the window of opportunity is missed, disaster may be the result. Note that this kind of reasoning may also be applicable to situations involving rapid contamination, such as oil spills or nuclear accidents, in which timely interventions, such as cleanups or evacuations, may serve to prevent or minimize the harm done by the incident. Like other types of decision-making crises, environmental crises are exacerbated by uncertainties regarding the nature of the natural or technical processes involved, the effectiveness and possible side effects of potential intervention measures, and the severity of the threats posed to the health of human beings and ecosystems.

It should be emphasized that the decision-making approach to FPA in general and crisis decision making in particular is not only being extended to new types of problems and sectors of international policymaking but also to new kinds of actors.
For example, scholars (see Reinalda and Verbeek 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Wergeni 2001) have begun to open up the black box within international governmental and nongovernmental organizations to study their cultures and decision-making processes in crises as well as under more normal conditions. Similarly, the various institutions of the EU have become the subject of much scholarly interest (for example, Hill 1996; Wallace and Wallace 2000; White 2001). Some (for example, Regelsberger, Schoutheete, and Wessels 1997; Grönvall 2000; Duke 2002) have even begun to assess the capacity of the EU to cope with civil and military crises of various kinds.

The erosion of the distinction between domestic and international, which has accompanied trends toward regional integration, internationalization, and globalization, will probably continue unabated with the side effect of further broadening the FPA agenda and substantively linking foreign policy analysts with their counterparts in various adjacent areas of public policy. Such a process will help bring FPA scholars into closer contact with their cousins in the field of comparative public policy—which in turn is likely to enrich the conceptualization of policy processes in our own field. It is important to remember that foreign policy processes are not only “foreign” but also “policy” (see Sabatier 1999; Carlsnæs 2002). Cross-pollination across fields is not a one-way street. Conceptual and methodological developments from foreign policy crisis studies are increasingly being picked up by scholars working in other areas of public policy (see, for example, Rosenthal, ’t Hart, and Charles 1989; Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001; Stern and Sundelius 2002; Stern et al. 2002).

Some Practical Problems for the Research Agenda

In *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, John Dewey (1938:499) argues that the most vibrant and useful social science grows “out of actual social needs, tensions, ‘troubles’.” The following are a list of a few topics particularly ripe for examination by foreign policy analysts and crisis studies experts.

Scholars and practitioners alike have long struggled with the challenge of how to strike an appropriate balance between complacency and paranoia in the face of domestic and international environments characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and a wide range of potential threats. On the one hand, the literature (Vertzberger 1990; Parker and Stern 2002) suggests that strong institutional, psychological, and political tendencies toward denial of threat have contributed to unpleasant surprises such as Pearl Harbor, the Yom Kippur War, and, most recently, the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center. On the other hand, the literature on international conflict and security (for example, Jervis 1976; Buzan 1991; Lebow and Stein 1994) has documented a number of mechanisms and dynamics that can produce exaggerated perceptions of threat and can result in conflict escalation. Heightened consciousness of the politicized nature of the threat discourse and the role of various “threat entrepreneurs” is a step in the right direction (see Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998; Eriksson 2001), but it does not provide much guidance for governments and citizens beyond the adoption of a posture of healthy skepticism and criticism of the source. Clearly, structured, focused, comparative research (George 1979a; Kaarbo and Beasley 1999) into cases involving under-, over-, and relatively accurate threat estimation is needed to better understand the processes and causal mechanisms at work in producing these various outcomes (see Jentleson 1999). Such research is the best point of departure in the effort to identify best practices and formulate prescriptive theories in this critical area.

The complex and multifaceted nature of the contemporary security agenda makes the task of identifying and prioritizing among various potential threats ever more difficult. The failure of the US national security apparatus to respond more
vigorously to the threat posed by Al Qaeda (and to make optimal use of the various clues that were in the system) prior to the latter’s attacks is illustrative. It was very difficult for a predominantly state-centric national security apparatus to shift gears in response to a mounting threat emanating primarily from a nonstate actor, including a shadowy terrorist network.

Similarly, we need to cultivate governmental and international organizational capacity to respond to a variety of more structural and insidious security threats. It was noted above that acute environmental and health crises have been relatively neglected in crisis decision-making studies (exceptions include Alkan 2001; Noji 2001). The SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak of 2003 is a good example of a serious transnational security threat with a wide range of political and economic repercussions. Aside from being a significant threat to human health, indirect effects of the outbreak have had dramatic economic consequences for the global tourism and transportation industries. Economic activity has ground nearly to a halt in large parts of China and has been significantly disrupted in a number of other countries in Asia and North America. Clearly, transnational threat phenomena such as SARS pose grave challenges to the coping and collaborative capacities of states and of the developing World Health Organization regime for disease control (Noji 2001). The literature on domestic crisis management suggests that communication between experts and policymakers is likely to be problematic in such contingencies (see Neustadt and May 1986; Liberatore 1993). Adding more layers of jurisdiction and a variety of cultural and political barriers is not likely to make things any easier (Grönvall 2000). However, it should be noted that dramatic crises also bring unusual opportunities for learning and change. The Chernobyl crisis of 1986 had a dramatic catalytic effect not only on the implementation of Gorbachev’s domestic political reform project and rapprochement with the West, but also on the development of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear safety and accident management regime (Stern 1999). Optimistically we can wonder if the 2003 SARS epidemic will ultimately hasten the liberalization of China and contribute to the further development of a global capacity to combat infectious disease?

Last but not least, an old topic closely linked to international crisis studies has gained new relevance in the post-September 11 world, namely, the potential and limits of deterrence. During much of the Cold War, the stability of the largely bipolar international system was thought to rest on a balance of terror, in which mutually assured destruction created a stable nuclear stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union. The common strategy of both superpowers was to deter each other (not to mention other rising and potentially revisionist powers) from aggression by threatening massive conventional, and if need be nuclear, retaliation. Aware of the centrality of deterrence in the practice of international relations, scholars (for example, George and Smoke 1974; Morgan 1983; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985) rose to the challenge of conceptualizing, analyzing, and attempting to learn from the successful and less successful practices of deterrence. Not surprisingly, once the relationship between the superpowers was transformed by the end of the Cold War, the theory and practice of deterrence was demoted to a somewhat less privileged status among scholars and practitioners of international relations (Jervis 2002).

However, the problem of deterrence will probably rise once again on the practical and academic agenda. Why? Strongly influenced by the shock of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration published an authoritative national security strategy document late in 2002. This document argues for a new and more proactive approach to coping with security threats to the United States. In fact, one of the most fundamental and controversial aspects of the strategy is the proposed shift of emphasis from deterrence to preemption (Gaddis 2002). The main thrust of the strategy rests on the seemingly plausible assumption that terrorists cannot be
deterred. Even though this assumption has a considerable degree of intuitive plausibility in a world still under the shadow of the kamikaze-style attacks of September 11 and in which suicide attacks are a regular feature of the Middle Eastern political scene, this idea deserves closer scrutiny.

Deterrence theorists should team up with area studies experts on international terrorism (for example, Ranzorp 1997; Gunaratna 2002) to improve our conceptual and empirical knowledge base on what would appear to be a crucial policy question. If some terrorists are deterrable whereas others are not, it would be very useful to know why. Moreover, are there historical examples of successful deterrence of terrorism and, if so, how was it accomplished? The experience of countries such as Germany, France, Spain, Holland, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Israel should be closely scrutinized and compared. For example, during the 1980s, citizens of many Western countries were taken hostage in Lebanon. The Soviet Union meanwhile was apparently a less attractive target despite potentially provocative behaviors such as the invasion of Afghanistan. Was the difference the result of a successful deterrence strategy or were there other factors at work in producing this outcome? Is it possible to deter states that have sponsored terrorism or harbored terrorists in the past from doing so in the future? Is such deterrence best practiced by individual states acting alone, in ad hoc coalitions of the willing, or via multilateral efforts in the United Nations and regional organizations? Are there lessons to be learned from the efforts of the international community to cope with the problem of skyjacking in the 1970s and 1980s? These topics and questions demand close scholarly examination.

Conclusion

In the four decades since the publication of Hermann’s (1963) initial definition of crisis in the interdisciplinary Administrative Studies Quarterly, the crisis studies literature has made a number of important metatheoretical, theoretical, and practical contributions to the FPA, IR, and public administration literatures and is likely to continue to do so. Policymakers, journalists, and citizens alike are in need of conceptual and analytical support in their attempts to understand, cope with, and learn from these turbulent, threatening, and often bewildering times. Helping them to do so remains an important and worthy challenge for analysts of foreign and public policy.

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