Peace-Building Operations in the Post Cold-War Era:

THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

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"This genocide resulted from the deliberate choice of a modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power. This small, privileged group first set the majority against the minority to counter a growing political opposition within Rwanda. Then, faced with RPF success on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, these few powerholders transformed the strategy of ethnic division into genocide. They believed that the extermination campaign would restore the solidarity of the Hutu under their leadership and help them win the war, or at least improve their chances of negotiating a favorable peace. They seized control of the state and used its machinery and its authority to carry out the slaughter."

~ Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch, March 1999

Since the United Nations initial creation of peace-building operations in the post-Cold War era, there have been circumstances, in which the results were both inefficient and devastating. One of the most significant cases that was almost completely ignored by the United Nations was the genocide that occurred during civil war in Rwanda. The Rwandan genocide began in April, and ended in July of 1994.

In the near four month time range that the atrocity befall upon Rwandans, approximately twenty percent of the country's total population was annihilated. The genocide was aimed at the Tutsi by the political elites of the Hutu. These powerful government officials eradicated seventy percent of the Tutsi during the four short months of genocide. The plan had been implemented by the Hutu as the civil war had escalated in the early 1990s. Hutu elites instructed all Hutu to use barbaric measures in order to wipe out the Tutsi(men, woman, and children), including using weapons to rape, inflict serious injury, and murder neighboring Tutsi.
The Hutu were also told to steal, and destroy all of the Tutsi property. The purpose of this crime against humanity was to cleanse Rwanda of any Tutsi blood. In the aftermath, not only was the death toll horrifyingly high, but the shocking amount of rape left many of the survivors with HIV. During this time, the United Nations did not attempt to provide security, provisions, or rations for the Tutsi. The overall international response was disheartening. The United States was slow to react, and feared to use the term, "genocide" for it imposes a necessity to act, which, at the time, the United States did not feel it was necessary. The genocide in Rwanda shortly followed the United States involvement in Somalia, which possibly played a role in their lack of assistance. In Accordance, France (although of the most assistance) was also slow to react. By the time the Security Council, and a mutual international decision to go into Rwanda, it was too late. The majority of the troops arrived shortly after the fact.

The Rwandan genocide is a significant topic because it may provide an understanding of how to stop genocide from occurring, provide examples of how this specific case and consubstantial cases can be managed, and hopefully resolved.

Similarly, this research might answer how the UN's Peace-Building Operations can better manage conflict in the future. Also, why the United Nations stayed out of the massacre in Rwanda, what could of the U.N. had done to better manage such atrocities; and how international management might deal with genocide, in particular. Most importantly, these research hopes to answer whether it was an unique situation that could have not been resolved without letting it play out.
ORIGIN OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

In 1994, during a ten week period, more than 750,000 Tutsi men, women, and children, out of a population of 7 million Rwandans, were slaughtered. For decades, Rwanda's two dominate tribes, the Hutu and Tutsi, had been at one another's throat since the imperial rule of Germany, and Belgium. As Samuel Totten et al. (1997) explain in their book, Belgian policies dramatically changed in the mid-1950s in response to pressure from the U.N. Trusteeship Council, and as a result of a new generation of Catholic missionaries. The Belgium policy shifted to assisting Hutus with education opportunities. The Tutsi, at that time, were dominate and resisted Hutu development. This resulted in the problems that are still seen today in Rwanda. Civil war has remained commonplace between the two tribes, as power shifted to the Hutu. Up until the ten week atrocity of 1994, the United Nations had been very much aware of the issues in Rwanda. They had already established the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda(UNAMIR).

At the time that the genocide began, Romeo Dallaire was at command of the mission. When Dallaire expressed his concern, UN Secretariat believed it to be a renewal of civil war, and did not act. At the time that the military coup and assassination of the Prime Minister, the media was focused on Somalia which shifted to South African elections. In weeks to come, the UNAMIR was continuously depleted of resources, and funds. The death of 10 Belgian soldiers lead to the withdraw of Belgium assistance in Rwanda. Limited media coverage (maximum of 15 in contrast to 2,500 accredited to cover the elections in South Africa at the time) provoked the United States to finally act, although the majority of the victim's lives had already been claimed.
by the Hutus. It was not until ten weeks after the genocide began that the UN Security Council implored Chapter VII, which authorized member states to set up operations in Rwanda. The majority of member states did not participate for various reasons, and the United States, Canada, and France provided the majority of the aid to the Hutu victims of genocide, amputation, and rape. Ultimately, when news spread of the failure in Rwanda, the UN was to blame, as people tend to recall the UN's failures over success stories.

Even still, if the main purpose of the creation of the United Nations (UN) was to put a stop to war after the end of WWII, strengthen the cooperation of nation-states through the formation of an international organization by maintaining peace-building operations, human rights, economic and social development, humanitarian and natural disaster aid, environmental issues, and preventing armed conflict; then why was the atrocity in Rwanda during 1994 completely ignored by the UN? The purpose of this review is to provide an objective account of the Rwandan genocide, un-cover the reasoning behind the failure, and provide conflict management styles that could of assisted the UN, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and the Rwandan government in 1994; as well as future instances that may be similar to this atrocity.
THE UNITED NATIONS

The concept of the United Nations originates in Immanuel Kant's argument in *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795):

- Peoples, as states, like individuals, may be judged to injure one another merely by their coexistence in the state of nature (i.e., while independent of external laws). Each of them, may and should for the sake of its own security demand that the others enter with it into a constitution similar to the civil constitution, for under such a constitution each can be secure in his right. This would be a league of nations, but it would not have to be a state consisting of nations. That would be contradictory, since a state implies the relation of a superior (legislating) to an inferior (obeying), i.e., the people, and many nations in one state would then constitute only one nation. This contradicts the presupposition, for here we have to weigh the rights of nations against each other so far as they are distinct states and not amalgamated into one.

The influence of Kant's proposition was highly influential following WWI. After alliances began to wage war that was obviously only going to escalate, as long as there was no international organization formed to distinguish the possibility of global domination by a single nations militaristic agenda, forty two founding members quickly assembled the League of Nations.

Although WWI only brought more issues at hand, internationally the formation of the League of Nations was essential in providing a stage for international peace-building operations. In the intermission of the world wars, the League of Nations (headed by the allied powers)
created a plan coined the "mandate system" in order to supervise German colonies. Consequently, the blame put on Germany did not nothing but stir the pot. The ineffectiveness of the League of Nations during its short time, brought about the United Nations in 1945.

According to UN's website on the Peace-building Commission (2014), "The Peace-building Commission plays a unique role in (1) bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributing countries; (2) marshalling resources and (3) advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building and recovery and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace." The current states that are on the PBC's agenda include Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and the Central African Republic. The UN affirms responsibility of resolving all issues regarding conflict throughout the world. They also claim that it is their duty to protect the people of every state from any sort of threat by a different state, their own government, and from all individual with each state's borders.

In a research article by George Kaloudis (1993), the United Nations was created as a worldwide collective security that depended solely upon preserving the post-World War II alliance. The ability for the Grand Alliance (Great Britain, the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and France) to remain stable relied heavily upon a common enemy. When the Nazi regime was defeated, the differences between the U.S.S.R and western allies caused conflict which resulted in a collapse of the alliance.

Although Great Britain, France, and the U.S. remained friendly, the communistic behavior of the U.S.S.R created mistrust between the former allies. The mistrust which led to the collapse was also mainly due to a containment policy of communism, and the U.S.'s bombing of
Japan; which illustrated the powerful force of the U.S. military for the first time in the world. Since the alliance deteriorated directly after the war, western allies isolated themselves from eastern European, and several Asian countries.

Similarly, Kaloudis notes Anthony Parsons' assumption that the UN cannot provide solutions for disputes, but can only be resolved by direct negotiations among the disputants themselves. This may include mediation, adjudication, or arbitration with great respect to the jurisdiction of the disputants.

**FAILURE IN RWANDA**

**UNAMIR**

As illustrated in the case with Rwanda, Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda, (1993-1994) explains in his book entitled *Shake Hands With The Devil* that the mission was a complete failure. He notes that the complete failure was due to the fact that not only was Rwanda populated by poor, black Africans, that held no political nor economic clout; but the lack of funds, "UN red tape", political manipulation, and his own personal limitations were significant factors (2003). Dallaire notes Canada's response to United States' pressure to increase defense spending. In the 1980s, during Ronald Reagan's presidency, the U.S. was spending trillions of dollars to win the Cold War. This influenced the Canadian government to invest more in their defense budget, and Dallaire's UNAMIR sensed they could finally feel relief.
Within a short period of time, the Department of National Defense decreed that UNAMIR's plan was not affordable, and it was essential that they worked harder on their policy. Thus in turn, morale dropped significantly. Dallaire also became a father during this time, and had to go back to Canada to take care of his wife, and newborn son. All happening at once, these issues stagnated the U.N.'s operations in Rwanda.

Sanford R. Silverburg's *International Law: Contemporary Issues And Future Developments* (2011) introduces the notion that any response from outside parties in regards to the problems, as they arose in Rwanda, would necessitate a major commitment of resources which does not directly affect the self-interest of those states outside of the immediate area. Silverburg argues that this is the reason why there was a high degree of reluctance in states to immediately respond in similar instances to Rwanda (such as Cambodia).

"GENOCIDE"

Further research indicates that UN officials decided not to use the term "genocide" in regards to the atrocity at the time because doing so would incite peace-building operations, which were not desired by world leaders at the time. To this day, it is more common in research, and reports for the genocide to be labeled as an "experience", or "conflict". Although these terms can be used interchangeably, in regards to taking actions, the specific word usage can allow, or disallow the U.N. to do so. Former president of the U.S., Bill Clinton (as well as others) made statements regretting the fact that they did not use the correct term as soon as they had attained intelligence. In addition, no one could of assumed that the civil war would result in
a staggering amount of casualties in Rwanda. Even before the Hutus received arms from Poland, the U.N. peacekeepers were already overwhelmed with the strategic maneuvers of the Hutu. Another reason for this incapability is that peacekeepers typically go into operations with the expectation that they will succeed. They usually do not leave room for disappoint, or in this case, failure. Such optimism can cause more conflict than there was beforehand.

**MISCOMMUNICATION**

Although the ill-timed empathy does not go unrecognized, it is a far cry from implementing plans of action to resolve issues when they were taking place. As J. Martin Rochester states, the UN Human Rights Commission was formed in order to receive annual reports on "good faith", but the confidential information can easily be misconstrued by state leaders, and cover up human rights violations.

Furthermore, the UN's Human Rights Commission publicizes an annual "black list", as Rochester describes, which includes countries that are being scrutinized, as they attempt to shame them as a tactic to promote international norms. This committee, as well as several others undertake measures to influence international actors to comply with powerful nation-states views and opinions on governance(2012).

In contrast, classified documents were released more recently proving that the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A), and the United States government were very much aware of the Rwandan genocide prior to its commencement. This information concluded that, since the
United States stood to win nothing by acting and because they had no interests in Rwanda, the fear of another debacle (such as in Somalia) led Clinton to ignore the issue.

In further support of this finding, As Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns (2012) emphasize in their book, that the United States was heavily involved in Somalia at the time when the genocide began in Rwanda. These authors express how the UN's missions prior to the Rwandan genocide are important in explaining the failure in mobilization during the "humanitarian disaster". Mingst also delves into how the U.N.s unsuccessful actions in Somalia produced a pattern of paralysis. Dealing with Rwanda, France was first to take action, be it too late, but other UN member states (especially the United States) waited until public outcry, produced by the media, induced alacrity (as mentioned in the Rwandan Genocide section of this review).

In addition, the media coverage (or lack thereof) was a significant contribution to the mishap of providing relief during the early stages of the genocide. Howard Adelman, and Astri Suhrke highlight the blip regarding the shooting down of the Prime Minister's plane and the reporting on the slaughters. These incidents were considered "ancient tribal feuds", and the withdrawal of foreign personnel lead to a drop in media coverage (1996). The authors emphasis that the true threat, confusion upon Rwandan soil, and the restriction of reporters were extensively problematic. Although in Africa, the media was focused on Somalia, South African elections, and Burundi; much of the lack of coverage in Rwanda was also due to sheer incompetence.

Most obvious in hindsight was the U.N.'s focus on peacekeeping operations without gaining Rwanda intelligence. Adelman et al. (1996) furthers his argument by describing just
how the Western stereotypical perceptions of Africans negatively affected peacekeeping
operations from being successful during the genocide. A primary example of the stereotypical
perception is that of then director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Roger Winter, who wrote
off the political and organized nature as another case of "African tribal bloodletting" and a
"fatalistically superficial interpretation".

INTERNATIONAL LAW & THEORY

In consideration of the timing of the Rwandan genocide, not only in respect to recent
activities in Somalia, Burundi, and South Africa; Samantha Powers describes how the U.N. had a
limited staff of a few hundred with 70,000 peacekeepers on seventeen missions around the world
(2002). Along with the lack of focus and limited staff, at the time that genocide ensued in
Rwanda, the U.S. had grown weary of U.N. involvement. Former U.S. president Bill Clinton
had been pressured to question the U.N.'s capabilities, and then senator Bob Dole had pushed to
introduce legislation to limit U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Similarly, Eva Bertram's (1995) research suggests further evaluation of the United
Nations Peace-Building Operations in the post Cold War era. Bertram evaluates three dilemmas
to the U.N's ability, and she also notes the U.N.'s limit of power. The concept of security and
democracy pose an interesting dilemma for the U.N. The tension between the peace makers
(military ending the war) and the peace builders (democratic peace), as Bertram notes brings
about the countries desire for security, as well as peace before democracy. Thus conceding to
the governmental composition that was faulty to begin with before the U.N.'s Peace-Building
Operations took place. This dilemma, as Bertram coins it the "Security-Versus-Democracy Dilemma", as well as her two other dilemmas, can also provide insight into how the UN operated during the time of the Rwandan genocide.

Secondly, Bertram's "Sovereignty Dilemma", which includes the U.N.'s Article 2.7 of the Charter that states, "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" except when the Security Council is enforcing the collective security provisions of the Charter, an influx of smaller nations-states who utilize this article to defend their right from intrusion, and weaker states' governments are generally a source of the internal conflict. This dilemma is of great importance while addressing issues regarding the Rwandan genocide, as the Hutu elites were in power, as well as the source of the atrocity.

Lastly, concerning Bertram's "Neutrality Dilemma", Article 40 of the Charter states that provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of a threat to or breach of the peace "shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned." Again, the civil war in Rwanda between the Hutu and the Tutsi tribes poses questions on such rights, claims, and positions of the two parties.

Interestingly enough, Silverburg (2011) introduces a wide array of information in regards to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Sanford contests that the ICTR was established specifically for the Hutus of Rwanda, but since many fled to neighboring states; the ICTR had to expand its boundaries. Refugees escaping to Burundi and Zaire caused more complications. It made it very difficult for peacekeepers to retain conflicts within Rwanda. Most notably, Hutus who fled to Zaire made it difficult for the UN Security Council to act fast,
as they had done in the case of Bosnia and Serbia. As Silverburg suggests, the UN Security Council moved to withdraw its mission, which made it perceived more so condoning the genocide in Rwanda.

**SUI GENERIS**

**CONFLICT MANAGEMENT & RESOLUTION**

"Given the scale of trauma caused by the genocide, Rwanda has indicated that however thin the hope of a community can be, a hero always emerges. Although no one can dare claim that it is now a perfect state, and that no more work is needed, Rwanda has risen from the ashes as a model of truth and reconciliation." ~ Wole Soyinka

In regards to the aftermath, research by Ian Hurd (2011) provides details regarding the conflict management and resolution tools that were used after the fact. In order to regain composure in Rwanda, the UN met with the Rwandan government, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to established SC Resolution 872. So that the UN could assist the Rwandan government, they had to gain consent from these parties because under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, as a sovereign nation; Rwanda enjoyed protection from outside interference.

Also, one reviewed study by Ian Hurd (2011) describes how this "enjoyment" disabled the UNAMIR from taking forceful actions during the genocide. So without the ability to protect, and defend the victims during the genocide of 1994; UNAMIR officials had to sit back and watch the mayhem ensue. This is perhaps the third most frighten position to take during the
Rwandan genocide .. first, being the victim and second, being the Hutus which were forced to murder, and rape their Tutsi neighbors. Powers includes a description during the early stages of the genocide wherein peacekeepers attending to a church, witnessed children outside a school, totaling almost in the hundreds, being amputated and they smell of rotting flesh in the air. They were helpless to do anything at the time. Enforcement in future acts of genocide by U.N. officials shall assist in strengthening peacekeeping operations, but should come second to amicable conflict management styles.

Additionally, Hurd furthers the debate on the UN's refusal to use the term "genocide" in 1994. He notes William Schabas, who surveyed international law on genocide. Schabas described how genocide has been "as anti-social as time immemorial", and that it almost always is undertaken with the complicity of those in power. Past examples of Schabas claim include Nazi Germany, and Cambodia.

Although tribunals were established, they were held within their own states borders. According to Peter MaGuire (2014), there is a great possibility that members of the Khmer Rouge, in Cambodia will die of old age before seeing a trial date. This is due to a recent creation coined "Therapeutic Justice", wherein, as MaGuire describes in an interview by Seth Mydans (2008) that people freight trials with baggage. Maguire furthers his explanation by asking three important questions: how do you measure closure; how do you measure truth; and how do you measure reconciliation. MaGuire states that these are not empirical categories. Tribunals also have had a history of divvying out sentences which are much less than that of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) may indeed decide.
Richard H. Robbins (1999) expresses a concern that is contrary to media and several government reports. He outlines the Hutu-run government's political and economic reasoning for the genocide. Examining at least five monetary factors: the price of coffee; Rwanda's colonial history; the global interests (most notably France); interests of international aid agencies; and the perception that Western states had towards Africa at large, Robbins states that these are what caused the Rwandan genocide. Shockingly, this further explains the avoidance of Western powers during 1994; as men, women and children were being brutalized. These deeper issues, and overlapping arguments also illustrate the isolationist mindset of many Western powers.

As Silverburg contests, the Rwandan genocide was somewhat of a milestone for humanitarian intervention. In the post Cold War era, the failure of the UN to succeed in Rwanda established a system of collective security, which (at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives) safeguarded human rights on a level that had not been seen before (2011). Further research will also address how the Rwandan genocide impacted more recent humanitarian efforts in other parts of the world.

Since there was no measure which could have been taken to become aware of what was to ensue in spring of 1993, no procedure to resolve the issue after the fact that it had begun, and such limited time in order to do so; the conflict and genocide in Rwanda is exceptional in comparison to other interstate crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. It provides a lesson to be learned for all future instances of conflict. As Adelman et al. (1996) suggests, implementing strategies to avoid these crimes, such as policies for conflict management that include improved ways to investigate and gain intelligence before instances occur can cater to flagging crisis in terms of severity and urgency.
Uniquely, the Rwandan genocide also happened over a much smaller timeframe than similar atrocities throughout history, although it shared in the result of a great scale of casualties. The Rwandan genocide additionally provides how a primitive country has the ability to cause as much devastation as a dominate nation-state, such as Nazi Germany during World War II. The Rwandan genocide is also exclusive because in the post Cold-War era with the U.N.'s push for peace-building operations, the Rwandan genocide was ignored by the world, at large. A resourceful aspect of Adelman et al. (1996)'s policy approaches to conflict management in regard to this aspect of the genocide, refers to increasing the international community's capacity to respond quicker to states, especially African states.

Further research may result in concluding other conflicts that have developed out of the Rwandan genocide. Interstate conflicts, as well as intrastate conflicts with neighboring states (i.e. refugees in both Burundi and Zaire). In addition, the dehumanization of women and children that survived the genocide may consequently bring future issues to the table. Three factors: The A.I.D.S epidemic resulting from rape; surviving offspring from mixed tribes; and obvious tension of a vast amount of amputees, may also result in other future conflicts. Although humanitarian aid and assistance had been provided, and the Rwandan genocide brought about a higher degree of U.N. peacekeeping operations concentration in Africa, a solvent is still in the works. Lastly, as Maguire suggests (2011), the recent invention of therapeutic legalism established in tribunals, and the U.N.'s political agenda have stagnated criminal indictment and prosecution in many tribunals. Researching the current status of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda would reveal answers to how exactly the executioners have been punished, and whether or not political justice has been effective in Rwanda.
References


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